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Abstract 
Today, one is expected to remember multiple user names and passwords for different 
domains when one wants to access on the Internet.  Identity management seeks to solve this 
problem through creating a digital identity that is exchangeable across organisational 
boundaries.  Through the setup of collaboration agreements between multiple domains, users 
can easily switch across domains without being required to sign in again.  However, use of 
this technology comes with risks of user identity and personal information being 
compromised.  Criminals make use of spoofed websites and social engineering techniques to 
gain illegal access to user information.  Due to this, the need for users to be protected from 
online threats has increased.  Two processes are required to protect the user login information 
at the time of sign-on.  Firstly, user’s information must be protected at the time of sign-on, 
and secondly, a simple method for the identification of the website is required by the user.  
This treatise looks at the process for identifying and verifying user information, and how the 
user can verify the system at sign-in.  Three models for identity management are analysed, 
namely the Microsoft .NET Passport, Liberty Alliance Federated Identity for Single Sign-on 
and the Mozilla TrustBar for system authentication. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Prologue 
With the great wave that has swept across the world in the form of the Internet, most people 
with Internet access have had an online identity created for them, in some cases without the 
users’ direct knowledge. Through the dot net boom of the 1990s and the subsequent crash of 
a number of these websites, the Internet and online purchasing have become more and more 
popular.  Companies and individuals have placed websites online, selling a variety of items 
from books to cars, all with online systems that have basic sign-in procedures.  These 
websites, Amazon and EBay for example, make use of complex analysis techniques that 
continuously build user profiles and user preferences, and offer to remember customer 
related information such as credit card information. All of this information is being collected 
through the relatively simplistic method of user sign-in tools such as the username and 
password.  But what are the implications of this simple sign-on methodology that is used in 
these environments and ultimately how can it be ensured that the user that is connecting to 
the system is who he claims to be? 
 
In order to understand the full scope of the problem, analysis needs to first take place to show 
the basics of the online environments and the way in which users act within them and the 
way in which they maintain their online identities.  An online identity is defined as a social 
identity that network users establish in online communities (Wikipedia, 2007).  Essentially an 
online identity is a representation of a physical person’s identity on the Internet.  This online 
entity can have multiple pieces of information attached to it, such as contact information, ID 
numbers and banking information, depending on the nature of the website.  A number of 
methods of social engineering are used in order to gain access to user information.  The most 
notable of these forms of information theft is the practice of online phishing. 
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines phishing as, “Fraud perpetrated on the Internet; 
specifically the impersonation of reputable companies in order to induce individuals to reveal 
personal information, such as passwords and credit card numbers, online.” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2006).  Granova and Eloff (2005) give a comprehensive definition, stating that 
phishing is, “the act of sending an email to a user falsely claiming to be an established 
legitimate enterprise in an attempt to scam the user into surrendering private information that 
will be used for identity theft”.  The exact meaning of the word phishing has changed over 
the past few years as the techniques to acquire information unlawfully have become more 
complex.  Fake websites, key-loggers and the use of Trojan Horse malware are now 
considered part of phishing attacks (Ollman, 2004). 
 
The sequence of successful phishing attacks can be described as: 
• Phisher prepares for attack 
• Malicious payload arrives at the recipient through a propagation vector 
• The user takes an action as a result of the delivered payload  
• User is prompted for confidential information, through the use of a website or through 
a Trojan Horse 
• User compromises confidential information after believing the request to be genuine 
• User confidential information is transmitted from the user to a phishing server setup 
by the phisher 
• Confidential information used by phisher to successfully impersonate the user 
• Phisher engages in fraud using compromised information (Emigh, 2005). 
 
It has been reported that the Association for Payment Clearing Services recorded fraud losses 
from online phishing scams in the UK reaching £12 million in 2004 (Caslon Analytics, n.d).  
It is clear that a simple username and password is not always the best solution to the 
management of an online identity as it is open to abuse and fraud.  In a recent report it was 
shown that phishing attacks have increased by 8000% over the period from January 2005 to 
September 2006, mainly due to more organised criminal activity in the phishing area as well 
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as the increase in awareness for security protocols from the banking industry (Phishing 
Increases as Users Get Wise, 2007).  This claim is shown to be true when examining the 
banking sector.  Standard Bank has implemented numerous security measures, such as one-
time password usage per client login, to their banking systems, and is compliant with 
international Internet security protocols while making use of 128-bit encryption, ensuring 
that no third party can gain access to client information (Standard Bank, n.d).  The same is 
also seen in Absa Bank’s implementation of a similar one-time usage password for each 
transaction (Absa, 2006). 
 
In order to effectively deal with the risks inherent within this turbulent environment, the use 
of proper identity management principles need to be applied at the time of users signing on to 
systems.  Identity management is defined as, “a broad administrative area that deals with 
identifying individuals in a system and controlling their access to resources within that 
system by associating user rights and restrictions with the established identity” (SearchVoip, 
2006).  A simple example of identity management is that of driver licensing, in which drivers 
are identified by their license numbers and limitations, (such as being specified that a driver 
must drive with spectacles) and are thereby linked to the license number.  Identity 
management should be viewed as a tool for promoting the reduction of uncertainty between 
parties and a process to ensure that users are who they claim to be.  The process for verifying 
that a user is who they claim to be is known as authentication. 
 
Authentication is defined as the process of verification of the credentials of the entity 
attempting to make a connection to the service.  The process involves the sending of user 
credentials from the client to the server via a plaintext or encrypted form in the use of an 
authentication protocol (Microsoft, 2005).  The process of authentication is not to be 
confused with that of authorisation, defined as the confirmation that the connection attempt 
to the service is allowed, and occurs after a successful authentication of the user, when access 
is granted based on user rights (Microsoft, 2005).  The difference between the process of 
  4 
authentication and authorisation can be seen in a basic implementation of user sign-on as 
performed in the Kerberos System in Figure 1.1 
 
Figure 1.1 – Authentication & Authorisation Interactions in a client/server application (Duke University, n.d) 
In Figure 1.1 the client or user makes an attempt to connect to the service.  When a 
connection has been made to the service, the authentication service is called to verify the 
user’s identity and validate that they are whom they claim to be.  After the authentication 
process has completed, the authorisation service will be called by the initial service which 
was called by the client and will be responsible for the granting of access to the client, based 
on user roles, for use of the system (Duke University, n.d.). 
 
To ensure users are who they claim to be, especially within an online environment in which 
stringent controls are required (as in the banking sector for example),  the use of an 
authentication tool other than that of only a single key authentication password is required.  
This can be shown by the implementation of such processes as Absa’s use of a Random 
Verification Number (RVN), as used for a one time only login key for each electronic 
banking session (Absa, 2006).  The use of dual key authentication over that of single key in 
the form of passwords promotes a greater feeling of trust from the user to the service 
provider as the controls used to guarantee the correct user authentication are higher.  
Depending on the viability of the use of the technology as well as whether the technology is 
  5 
necessary to meet the security requirements, in certain situations the implementation of a 
biometric authentication solution may be considered.   
 
Although large corporations have been set up in order to standardise the processes for online 
identity management and sign-on procedures, the risk still exists that an unauthorised 
individual could gain access to another person’s account information.  Larger corporations 
such as Microsoft are attempting to stabilise the situation through the introduction of their 
own ideas of standardising the online authentication methods through .NET Passport. There 
have been a number of problems, even a case where users’ online wallets could have been 
compromised due to a gap in Passport’s security (McWilliams, 2001). A similar situation 
was uncovered in 2003 when a security loophole within Passport allowed attackers to obtain 
the passwords of early .NET Passport adopters by giving only minimal personal client 
information, such as an e-mail address and postal code (McCormick, 2003). On top of this 
issue is the magnitude of usernames and passwords for each different account.  Users are 
supposed to remember these without the use of pen and paper, as writing them down could 
compromise their security. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
1.2.1 Main Problem: 
What processes must be adhered to by the client user and the website, to ensure the 
protection of the user’s identity in the online environment? 
 
Due to the ubiquitous nature of the Internet and computing, users are unknowingly 
connecting to online environments that have simple client authentication processes.  The 
authentication process may occur on fraudulently set up spoofed websites.  This exposes the 
user to the risk of potential identity theft, resulting in possible financial losses. 
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In a recent survey showing the incidents of online fraud, it was reported that the online loss 
of revenue due to fraud has risen from $1.5 billion in 2000 to $3 billion in 2006. 
(CyberSource, 2007).   This statistic is further supported by another report showing that 
losses within the United Kingdom rose by 55%, from £14.5 million in the first half of 2005 
to £22.5 million in the same period in 2006 (Young, 2006).  Due to the large increase in 
online fraud within the last few years, it has been suggested that merchants be far more 
careful when deciding which orders they fulfil and which they will reject. Rejections by U.S. 
based merchants are up to 13% for all orders originating outside the U.S.   (Sullivan, 2004). 
 
Surprisingly, in the face of the large sums of capital lost to online fraud, a joint study 
between Washington University and Princeton University discovered that there was a notable 
lack of concern from online users about trust in the online environment, online identities and 
online interactions (Friedman, Nissenbaum, Hurley, Howe & Felten, 2002).  This statistic is 
alarming due to the clear rise in online fraud and identity abuse over the past few years.  It is 
unsurprising that unlawful acts are perpetrated against individuals online in order to gain 
illegal access to information and the theft of online identities. 
1.2.2 Sub-Problems: 
• What are the critical success factors for identification and authentication of a 
user at time of sign-on? 
• What process can be used to ensure a user is connecting to an authentic website? 
• How can users be adequately protected from common online threats?  
The above identified sub-problems are based on the main problem previously defined.  By 
answering each of these questions a set of processes can be defined.  Each of these processes 
will contribute in addressing the research problem, and once all three problems have been 
solved, this will mean the main research problem has been addressed. 
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1.3 Objectives 
The objective of this study is to produce a model through which users can experience a more 
secure online environment by making better use of existing identification and authentication 
procedures.  These improvements should ensure that the individual with the proper security 
access can link to the secure environment, and guarantee that they are who they claim to be, 
whilst ensuring that the website attempting to be accessed is authentic.  This process should 
be performed through the use of multiple forms of authentication and authorisation methods, 
protocols and controls. 
1.4 Methodology 
The research will be performed by means of an extensive literature review in order to gain 
more knowledge and to make inferences from the work of experts in the field of identity and 
access management within the online environment.  As this research will be performed by 
means of a literature review, the sources of data will stem from journals, academic papers, 
books, case studies, news articles and examples from around the world.  The research will be 
performed using the process of qualitative and interpretive research methods.  Systems 
Theory will be examined through the course of this study, showing how one process change 
will have an impact on another. 
1.5 Outline of the Treatise 
The treatise provides a background to user identification at the time of sign-on to online 
systems.  This is done by investigating the needs of the online environment, and the process 
by which users are verified in order to gain access to the online environment.  Chapter 1 
provides a background to the problem of identifying users in an online environment, the 
potential problems within the sign-on process due to illegal activities, and begins to look at 
the overall guidelines of identity management, such as identification and verification 
processes.  The focus moves towards identity management processes and the security 
practices surrounding online environments to provide an overview of identity management 
and begins to delve into how users are identified as who they claim to be in Chapter 2.  In 
  8 
Chapter 3 the focus moves to authentication management and authorisation procedures, and 
the requirements to identify who a user of the system is.  Chapter 4 investigates models that 
are currently used in the process of identifying users at the time of sign-on to online systems.  
Particular attention is given to the current business leaders in this field, with Microsoft’s 
implementation of the Single Sign-on identity domain in .NET Passport.  The 
implementation of the Federated User Identity Model promoted by Liberty Alliance will be 
examined.  Finally, a look at Mozilla’s TrustBar implementation of the personal service 
provider identity model, which incorporates the use of personal authentication devices within 
identity management, will be examined.  A comparison and critical analysis of the models 
described will take place in order to show the strengths and weaknesses of these different 
implementations and gather some insight into how they can be improved.  In Chapter 5 
recommendations are made regarding the lessons learned from the critical analysis of the 
models in Chapter 4, specifically looking at integration of traditional user identity 
management models, with user-centric identity management models.  A conclusion 
summarising the ideas expressed through this study will be in Chapter 6, providing an 
overview of the entire treatise by summarising the main concepts of the document. 
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Chapter 2 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
In the constantly changing world of information technology and the inherent threats of new 
technologies to businesses, identity management and information security are of major 
concern for organisations.  Processes are required to manage compliancy of country specific 
laws and effectively manage business risks.  The process of putting effective controls in 
place to counter these business risks can be a source of confusion.  This chapter will begin 
with a brief overview of identity management in order to fully understand why it is required 
and what is involved in the managing of a user identity.  The overall requirements for the 
attributes of an identity are described to show the nature of user information that needs to be 
protected.  The chapter then moves on to the identity management life cycle in order to 
understand the process that should be followed in order to successfully manage an identity.  
The requirements for identity management systems in both the public and private sector are 
then discussed.  The role of an identity in the online environment is discussed within digital 
identities.  Possible solutions are then proposed in order to determine the best way for 
implementation of an identity management solution within an enterprise.  The business 
benefits of using an identity management solution will be shown by looking at previous 
implementations in well established companies such as Fujitsu, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and 
Onyx.  Finally a look at the different standards initiatives will take place, focusing on Liberty 
Alliance and Microsoft. 
2.1 Identity Management Overview 
As the possible uses of the Internet continue to be realised, companies and users require more 
control over the identity-related information belonging to a given person. This information is 
often scattered in a multiple number of systems throughout the organisation, some of which 
may even be controlled by third party suppliers (Sarbanes Oxley, 2007).  The scattered nature 
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in which this data is stored causes problems when attempting to create a seamless experience 
for users.  This is because the accessing of this information for authentication purposes, takes 
place across multiple different systems. 
 
Governments have enacted strict laws and regulations for different types of industries for the 
protection of information.  Compliance with these regulations is not an option but a strict 
requirement.  Audits need to be regularly performed to gauge an organisation’s adherence to 
these regulations.  Failure to comply can result in heavy fines and delays in moving specific 
products into the market.  The existence of scattered storage of identity management 
information makes compliance and audits extremely difficult. Table 1 provides some 
examples of the type of laws which have been implemented for the use of identity 
information. 
 
Law / Regulation Coverage Description 
Canadian Personal 
Information and 
Electronic Documents 
Act 
Privacy Applies to companies operating within Canada.  
Defines rules for protection of personal information, 
collection, usage and disclosure for commercial 
activities. 
European Data Protection 
Directive 
Privacy Applies to companies within the European Union 
(EU).  Addresses identity theft, online fraud and 
privacy issues of consumers, employees and citizens.  
Designed to standardise privacy laws in EU member 
states. 
Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National 
Commerce Act 
Electronic 
signatures 
Applies to companies operating in the U.S.  Allows 
for use in particular circumstances for legally binding 
electronic signatures. 
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Health Information 
Portability and 
Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) 
Privacy Applies to health care companies within the U.S.  
Calls for controls to safeguard health information on 
patients.  Establishes patients’ rights to control access 
of their personal health information.  Requires 
technical standards for access controls, audit, 
authorisation, data authentication, network 
authentication and security. 
Food and Drug 
Administration Rule 21 
CFR 11 
Records 
retention, 
electronic 
signatures 
Applies to pharmaceutical and other firms operating 
in the U.S.  Defines requirements for the control of 
electronic records, electronic document submission, 
and criteria for approved electronic signatures. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Privacy Applies to financial services firms in the U.S.  
Requires service providers to establish administrative, 
technical and physical safeguards to ensure the 
confidentiality of customer records.  Prohibits firms 
from disclosure of customer information without the 
consent of the customer. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Accountability Applies to public companies in the U.S.  Requires 
annual reports to assess effectiveness of internal 
controls and procedures (including identity 
management) for financial reporting. 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission  
Rule 17a-4 
Records retention Applies to securities brokers in the U.S.   Requires 
brokers and dealers to keep original documentation of 
all communications received and sent by a firm 
relating to their direct business. All account records 
have to be retained for six years. 
 
Customer Identification 
Program (U.S. Patriot 
Act) 
Privacy, record 
retention, identity 
verification 
Applies to financial services companies in the U.S.  
Requires processes for risk-based identification of 
new customers.  Companies must collect identity 
information from customers, verify that information, 
and compare that against government lists of 
known/suspected terrorists. 
 
Table 2.1 - Relevant Laws and Regulations (Lewis, 2003) 
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With the examples of legal requirements shown above identity management has been 
recognised as a means to control system access and reduce financial risks.  In order to realise 
this, a comprehensive approach to identity management is required, which warrants 
interoperability within applications.  These approaches should allow for the exchange of 
authentication, authorisation and other identity-related attributes, as well as identity-related 
operation requests in a standard and secure manner, thereby enabling users to get a 
personalised service experience, without requiring them to store personal information 
centrally.  Identity management solutions should therefore offer scalable, secure and reliable 
services (BMC Software, 2006). 
 
Overall identity management needs to be seen by businesses as a tool, which allows for them 
to adequately manage their systems securities.  The legal requirements are often put into 
place to provide a code of “best practice”, which can be seen in most implementations of 
corporate governance such as COBIT and ITIL.  Ultimately the company is responsible for 
the way in which they use identity information and are liable should that information fall into 
criminal hands.  In order to fully understand the concept of the form of information which 
companies will store, the inherent characteristics of an identity must be examined. 
2.2 Elements of an Identity 
An identity in respect of the online environment is an expression of individual’s unique 
characteristics in a format that is able to be recognisable online.  The type of information that 
may be used in both physical and online existence is that of ID numbers, banking 
information, and postal addresses. 
 
De Leeuw (2004) specifies three different types of identities.  The first is a biometric identity 
which is based on the physical attributes of the individual. These physical attributes include 
DNA, face recognition, and fingerprint identification.  The second type is an Attributed 
identity. This includes all data that is attributed to the individual such as full name, date and 
place of birth along with other forms of physical information.  The third type is the 
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Biographical identity. This includes information on education, criminal record, taxes, 
employment, and a multitude of other information normally described as private in nature. 
 
Due to the often sensitive nature of these types of information, and the large scale of fraud in 
the online environment, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, it is vital that identities are 
managed correctly within companies, for both customer’s and employee’s safety, and the 
reputation of the business should that information be compromised.  The identity 
management life cycle provides a strong basis for the management of customer and 
employee identities. 
2.3 Identity Management Life Cycle 
In order to successfully control identity management, an understanding of the life cycle of 
identities is required.  The first step in the solution to a more secure user environment is the 
implementation of proper identity management principles by businesses.  It is imperative that 
businesses make proper use of each step in the identity management life cycle to manage 
user profiles and information. 
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Figure 2.1 – Identity Management Process (Lukawiecki, 2006). 
The process is summarised as follows: 
• A new user is required to have access to the system 
o A user identity is created 
o Specific credentials are assigned to the user account 
o Access rights as specified are assigned to the account 
• Changes required to account are made 
o User is promoted and requires new access rights 
o User is transferred and requires new access rights 
o User is in need of different account privileges to perform their tasks 
• System Password Management 
o Management processes to ensure secure strong passwords 
o Reset of passwords by system manager 
• User Retirement and removal of privileges 
o Accounts are either frozen or deleted based on requirements 
o Account entitlements are removed 
New User 
 User ID Creation 
 Credential Issuance 
 Access Rights 
Account Changes 
 Promotions 
 Transfers 
 New Privileges 
 Attribute Changes 
 
Password Mgmt 
 Strong Passwords 
 “Lost” Password 
 Password Reset 
 
Retire User 
 Delete/Freeze 
Accounts 
 Delete/Freeze 
Entitlements 
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This diagram provides an overview of the basic concepts of identity management and the 
steps that are required to successfully manage the identity of users of systems.   This overall 
life cycle can be applied to most situations for sign-on. 
 
A number of products have been created in order to deal with the problems involved in 
successfully managing the life cycle of identities within an organisation.  According to 
Microsoft, identity life-cycle management includes the use of processes and technologies for 
the provisioning, de-provisioning, management and synchronisation of digital identities 
while remaining compliant with governance policies.  The success of an implementation of 
identity and access management relies mostly on the efficiency with which the digital 
identity life cycle can be managed (Microsoft, 2004a). 
 
Microsoft (2004a) makes mention of 5 management services which control the identity life-
cycle, which must be implemented within a secure environment and have provision made for 
a thorough audit trail. 
• Identity Integration – Links identity information within the multiple directories, 
databases and other identity stores.  It provides a unified view of users, and can 
implement identity provisioning and deprovisioning across the multiple stores of 
information. 
• Provisioning – Addition and removal of security principals in the centralised identity 
stores. 
• Delegated Administration – Delegation of the ability to manage specific aspects of 
digital identity to different users. 
• Self-Service – Ability for normal users to manage a section of their own identity in 
order to reduce the costs of management.  
• Credential Management – Different authentication mechanisms have different 
credentials, so any platform that supports multiple authentication mechanisms should 
have the capability for users to manage their own multiple credentials. 
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In order for a business to effectively manage their user base, there is a need to put processes 
into place that adequately control the life cycle of the users.  Should a user choose to 
deregister from the online service, their identity should be removed from that website as soon 
as possible in order to protect against any possible access violations and identity theft.  The 
fewer identities to manage on a system and the likelihood of infiltration diminish.  With the 
concept of how the digital “life” of an identity should be managed, the focus now shifts to the 
expectations of governments and businesses investing in identity management systems. 
2.4 Identity Management in Public and Private Domain 
Identities may be managed by either the entities themselves, in the case of the online 
environment, or by other parties.  These parties can either be public, such as personal records 
offices or immigration services, or private, like employers or shops. 
2.4.1 Private Sector Organisation Aims for Identity Management 
The key objectives of the private sector in the creation and use of identity management 
systems have distinct similarities and differences to those of the public sector.  A key 
similarity is that both public and private sectors require a system that has the ability to allow 
an end user to be able to perform a single sign-on.  There is also a desire in both sectors to 
enhance Customer Relationship Management (CRM) methods and increase opportunities to 
uncover fraud in their systems.  The private sector has additional requirements in order to 
remain competitive in a changing business environment.  In the private sector identity 
management can also be required in the formulation of a basic business strategy.  For 
example, an organisation may promote them by providing a proprietary single sign-on 
system to intermediate business relationships between their existing customers and other 
private companies. The private sector looks at the following drivers in identity management 
solutions: 
• Organizational Efficiency – Enabling of transactions and interpersonal 
communication. 
• Competitive Advantage – Capturing of larger market share over competitors. 
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• Security – Allow authorised access and prevent unauthorised access to information 
and services. 
• Speed of Reaction to Change – Mergers, reorganisations and departmental moves. 
• Fraud Prevention – Difficult to calculate but prevention will provide savings in the 
future. 
• Consistent Treatment of the Individual – Complete management of users and 
customers within the identity life cycle. 
• Integrated Information Infrastructure – Enable a move away from single information 
storage techniques (National Electronic Commerce Coordinating Council, 2002) 
 
With the private sector looking at new business opportunities available to the online 
environment, it is important that they focus on the needs of the customer.  The ability to 
provide for a seamless sign-on to a multitude of services, customization of the user’s 
experience and consistency of the business process, and closer relationships between the 
business and the customer through CRM technologies, provide a strong competitive 
advantage.  This process also makes a more comfortable, informal relationship with the 
customer, increasing the levels of trust through the steps taken by the online service in fraud 
prevention and the security of their personal information.  Governments are also making use 
of Internet technologies in order to handle interactions with citizens easily and in a more 
automated fashion than the traditional paper based methods.  The South African Revenue 
Service launched an online facility in 2006 for the submission of income tax returns via the 
Internet (South African Revenue Services, 2006).  Similar protections to citizen information 
are expected by citizens when making use of a government system for submission of 
sensitive information. 
2.4.2 Public Sector Aims for Identity Management 
Within the public sector, there are however a number of similarities with the private sector.  
The difference is that the public/government environment is normally a follower of the 
implementation of the private sector, and in many cases some previous steps for the private 
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sector must be implemented in order to meet the goals.  The goals of identity management 
for the public sector can be summarised as follows: 
• Interactions – Allowing of filling in of government forms via online methods, for 
example, tax filings, license renewals and grant applications. 
• Protection – Detection, tracking and apprehension of terrorists.  Federal legislation 
has been put in place to tighten identity authentication requirements for the 
transportation industry, specifically civilian air travel. 
• Availability – Availability of identity information when needed in authentication 
processes for individuals (NECCC, 2002). 
Identity management within the public sector is known as National Identity Management. 
Following the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the USA, attempts are being made worldwide 
to improve the quality of National Identity Management, with specific emphasis being placed 
on the use of biometrics to identify individuals (De Leeuw, 2004).  It can be seen as 
imperative that identity management fulfils the roles set out for it, in order to improve the 
level of trust within both the public and private sector. 
 
Now that the aims for public and private sector identity management have been defined, the 
role of identity management in the online environment must be defined. 
2.5 Digital Identity Management 
A digital identity is the representation of a human identity used within a network interaction 
with other machines or individuals.  The main objective of a digital identity is to reinstate the 
trust and ease that secure human transactions used to have, over an environment where face-
to-face meetings are impractical.  The attributes of a digital identity are: 
1. Who one is (identity) 
2. The credentials that one holds (attributes) 
The credentials are the defining factor for a digital identity.  A full digital identity is very 
intricate and possesses both legal and technical implications.  The simplest form of digital 
identity consists of a user name and password.  As systems have become more networked 
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and distributed, Digital Identity processes must be robust enough to build complex 
distributed user interactions, whilst making these interactions more user-friendly.  This must 
occur while maintaining the required controls and security demanded by both the public and 
government bodies.  Digital Identity can be used to facilitate the following operations:  
• Authentication – Proving the identity is what it claims to be in the transaction 
• Authorisation – Granting of permissions to access data or applications 
• Confidentiality – Ensuring no unauthorised party can intercept the data transmitted 
• Data Integrity – Ensuring that data has not been changed in transmission 
• Proof of Source – Use of public and private key encryption to ensure the document 
originated from the source it believes it should have 
• Non-Repudiation – Use of public and private key encryption to ensure the source and 
destination of a transaction 
• Reputation – Aggregation of signed information from various sources as proven 
credentials based on the past transactions history (DigitalIDWorld, n.d.) 
 
Digital Identities can therefore be seen to promote the ability of creating transactions across 
an environment in which people will normally never meet, while maintaining the existing 
identity based attributes that transactions have always had between individuals.  Often in 
these times the transactions seldom occur between two physical individuals.  With the advent 
of modern technology such as the web spider, making purchases on behalf of an individual, it 
is not even necessary for one individual to be involved in the transaction.  The overriding 
goal of the digital identity is to release certain required identity information when required, 
with the permission of its owner, in order to complete a transaction. 
 
Now that the attributes of an online identity have been defined, the solutions of how to 
effectively manage these entities need to be defined. 
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2.6 Identity Management Solutions 
With digital identities identified as a facilitator for the requirements specified by government 
and business management, it is important to understand how the attributes of a digital 
identity are implemented into a viable business solution.  With the existing nature of current 
business trends, in which budgets are being scaled back, companies are incredibly cautious 
when needing to invest large sums of capital into initiatives that will only provide a solution 
to a technical problem.  The modern era demands business solutions that provide more than a 
technical solution, but rather enable the business to meet its objectives set out in its vision 
and mission.  This process takes place through the use of Business Process Re-engineering 
(BPR) techniques to make improvements to the responsiveness to the business processes, 
with automated systems that promote self-service administration.  Through the use of such 
tools, the need for support staff that would have fulfilled that business role has been reduced.  
Identity management delivers measurable goals for return on investment by way of reduction 
in costs and an increase in productivity.  In order to make a successful implementation of an 
identity management solution, and thereby to realise the benefits of such a system, the 
implementation should be approached from a strategic vantage point.  
2.6.1 The need for a framework 
Identity management has a very wide scope, and has a role to play in a multitude of facets of 
the business.  It needs to be emphasised that identity management has to be implemented at a 
corporate-wide level in order to be effective in the business. Lewis (2003) comments that 
most implementations of identity management infrastructures are built one application at a 
time, rather than designed to be implemented on an enterprise scaled framework.  The result 
of this form of implementation is a spider-web of overlapping systems some of which 
perform the same functions as others with inconsistent policy frameworks.  These systems 
tend to be error-prone, expensive to manage and due to the inconsistencies of framework 
implementation, tend to be prone to security attacks (Vanamali, 2004). A framework can be 
implemented to enforce some form of control over this situation.  This framework will then 
become the baseline for all future identity management projects to be implemented. 
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2.6.2 Identity Management Framework 
Identity management frameworks can help align the chosen identity management initiatives 
with an organisation’s business objectives and security initiatives.  It focuses on issues 
relating to: 
• Business value delivery 
• Confidentiality and integrity of business data 
• Non-repudiation of services 
• Authentication and authorisation 
• Provisioning and deprovisioning of user privileges 
• Auditing 
• Compliance levels and monitoring (Vanamali, 2004) 
The key components of a framework for identity management based on a top-down approach 
are shown in Figure 2.2.  This approach shows each layer of the pyramid relying on the layer 
above it. 
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Figure 2.2 – Key Components of the Identity Management Framework (Vanamali, 2004) 
The key points of the framework are a security vision, identity management strategy, Policies 
and standards, identity management architecture, identity management specifications and 
identity management road maps.  Vanamali (2004) provides an overview of each of these 
levels. 
2.6.3 Security Vision 
Organisations must create a security strategy based on the current business and IT strategy, 
which must have executive support in order to be effective.  Identity management initiatives 
need to be closely aligned with an organisation’s security initiatives and should implement 
similar principles as the companies’ information security management systems scope, 
security principles and values.  The companies’ security visions should include: 
• Importance of information security within the organisation 
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• Need for securing of information assets 
• A plan for management of information assets 
• Risk management approach to control possible risks to data 
2.6.4 Identity Management Strategy 
An identity management strategy should align with an organisation’s business and IT 
strategy.  The strategy should be built on both the internal and external key business drivers 
of the organisation.  The strategy identifies: 
• Objectives for identity management. 
• Success criteria against all initiatives will be measured.  These include success factors 
to measure the effectiveness of objectives. 
• Anticipated business benefits, like improved business processes, cost reductions, 
improvement in service delivery. 
• Risks of the strategy, which require organisational change from the political and 
cultural perspective.  Initiatives that require cooperation from other sources need to 
be evaluated.  The strategy can be used to redesign business processes, workflows, 
show areas that could be improved through automation, correct control weaknesses 
and provide possible alternative solutions. 
2.6.5 Policies and Standards 
An identity management Framework needs to define a group of policies to be used for 
identity management.  These policies need to be able to cover generic and specific issues.  A 
framework defines the standards that all identity management initiatives pursued by a 
company must comply with, for example encryption levels, directory standards, etc.  It is also 
essential that the framework must define set information management guidelines laying 
down requirement for audits and compliancy checks.  This makes for a consistent process for 
measurement of all identity management initiatives. 
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2.6.6 Identity Management Architecture 
Companies need to have an enterprise architecture which encompasses the security 
architecture.  The architecture of an identity management system needs to conform to the 
guidelines imposed by the security architecture.  With this conformity the architecture must 
identify the key components of identity management in order to provide effective 
measurements for managing security across the organisation.  The main objectives of identity 
management architecture are: 
• To act as a blueprint for current and future identity management initiatives 
• To be effective, consistently applied, manageable and allow for practical 
implementation. 
Figure 2.3 shows the key components of an identity management solution. 
 
Figure 2.3 – Key Identity Management Components (Vanamali, 2004) 
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The control functions that are specified in the architecture need to support the design, 
implementation, maintenance and management of the identity management infrastructure.  
The core management components specified in Figure 2.3 are: 
• Directory services – The most critical component of identity management.  It is a 
repository for user ID and profile information, playing a key role in the authentication 
of users, and also enables on-demand service delivery. 
• User provisioning – Role-based approach driven by a directory, user provisioning 
oversees the complete life cycle of an identity across different systems. 
• Authentication services – This identifies the user through authentication methods, 
including digital certificates. 
• Access management infrastructure – Based on a set policy, an access management 
infrastructure controls access to information systems and applications. 
• Portal Services – Act as a presentation layer, providing a single interface for all web-
enabled systems and applications personalised to the users’ profile. 
2.6.7 Identity Management Specifications 
The detailed specifications are used to guide technology choices based on the business’ 
required functionality.  A key constraint is the understanding of how the components of the 
identity management architecture interact to meet the overall goals.  These specifications 
include the evaluation criteria for the integration and implementation of identity management 
solutions. 
2.6.8 Identity Management Road Map 
The definition of a road map is a critical step in the setting up of a framework.  The purpose 
of the road map is to identify the steps that need to be taken to deploy and integrate identity 
management components so that they are in line with the organisations overall identity 
management specifications, architecture, policies and standards, and identity management 
strategy.  It must also specify the priorities for the short to long term strategies, based on the 
potential business impact and value proposition. 
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2.7 Benefits of Identity Management 
The impact of a successfully implemented identity management system can be shown by 
assessing the outputs of such processes in well established companies. Sun Microsystems 
(n.d.) lists overall key benefits of identity management as the following: 
1. Assists in planning, implementation and management of solutions through a complete 
lifecycle of services portfolio. 
2. Reduces costs and complexity, while increasing the rate of Return-On-Investment 
made in identity management. 
3. Ensures predictable implementation procedures and efficient business operations, 
thereby ensuring greater system satisfaction from both users and customers. 
4. Manages all four main areas of concern for the business (people, process, practice and 
platform), when implementing identity management in the organisation. 
These can be seen as overall key benefits of identity management implementation.  Further 
implementations in other well known companies have produced similar results when 
implementing an identity management solution.  
2.7.1 Fujitsu 
Fujitsu has measured the benefits based on their use of their own People Data Management 
products: 
• Improved processes for employees joining and leaving the company allowed for large 
numbers (roughly 15% of total corporate email and NT accounts) to be removed as 
the users had left the company. 
• Improved security and decreased managerial overheads on mail and NT systems. 
• In the implementation of a new financial system, data relating to approximately 3,000 
employees was maintained manually.  This task required four full-time staff members 
and the data input was frequently error-filled. 
• A link from the People ERS was implemented in order for the finance system to have 
a regular and automated people data feed, which provides accurate data at less than 
25% of the previous manual cost. 
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• Minimal cost for the addition of more people to the financial system. 
• Easy access to the viewing of people data for the required manual processes such as 
staff management within departments and personal detail verification. 
• Ten to fifteen corporate systems that were previously operating independently, are 
now working from the same data (Locke & McCarthy, 2002). 
2.7.2 PriceWaterhouseCoopers Customer 
• Deployed an Oblix NetPoint 5.1/LDAP infrastructure as an enabler for identity 
management.  Functionality now exists for Web access security and scalable identity 
management infrastructure for offering a number of web based services. 
• Application integration standardisation – New applications now go through 
application integration processes such as web single sign on, access management and 
identity management. 
• Reduction in security development costs and lowering of costs for ongoing 
maintenance and help desk operations (Gordon, 2004). 
2.7.3 Onyx – Microsoft Onyx Case Study 
Onyx, a leader in the waste management industry in Europe, wished to synchronise the e-
mail and intranet directories to build an enterprise directory for employees.  In two months, 
Onyx improved their identity management processes in order to create a dependable identity 
infrastructure for all of the businesses collaborators.  The company now manages the profiles 
of their 5,000 French employees with a greater level of precision.  The benefits of the 
implemented system included: 
• Optimisations of identity management – Directories previously separate are now 
integrated and accounts of former employees are now easily located and removed. 
• Reliable Reference System for Employees – All identity information was moved into 
a consolidated directory for use by staff, which was always current and will be 
depended upon for the company’s applications. 
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• Future Development Base – Through the use of the new infrastructure multiple 
beneficial projects were planned, including the connection of the new infrastructure to 
Onyx sites outside of France. (Microsoft, 2004b) 
2.8 Standards Initiatives 
When setting up an identity management system for use within an organisation, the task can 
be seen as monumental.  Where does an organisation begin in setting up such a system that 
will meet its goals, and meet them while keeping the company secure?  Because of this 
uncertainty with regards to what should and should not be set up for an identity management 
system, the Liberty Alliance was set up in order to provide a baseline for best practices. 
2.8.1 History of Liberty Alliance 
The Liberty Alliance was initially formed in 2001 by organisations in order to establish a set 
of open standards, best practices and guidelines for the usage of federated identity 
management.  In 2002 they released Liberty Federation which became the industry standard 
used to address the authentication privacy and security issues inherent in online identity 
management.  Liberty Federation allows online users to authenticate and sign on to a network 
or domain only a single time from any device and make use of multiple websites.  The use of 
a federated approach usurps the problems of multiple authentications and supports privacy 
controls established by the user.  They then further contributed their federation specification, 
ID-FF, to OASIS which formed the foundation for Security Assertion Mark-up Language 
(SAML) version 2.0, the converged federation specification that Liberty now recognises.  
The Liberty Alliance has directly focused on business and policy making aspects of identity 
management, having published business and policy guidelines in a number of forms for 
different market segments (Liberty Alliance, n.d.). 
 
The overriding vision of the Liberty Alliance is the creation of a networked world based on a 
set of open standards, in which businesses can conduct online transactions seamlessly while 
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ensuring the protection of the privacy and security of an individual’s identity information.  
The members of the Liberty Alliance are working in order to meet the following objectives: 
• Build a set of open standard-based specifications for federated identity and identity-
based web services. 
• Drive global identity theft solutions. 
• Provide interoperability testing 
• Provide a certification programme for products that make use of the Liberty 
specifications. 
• Establish best practices, rules, liabilities and business guidelines. 
• Work in partnership with standards bodies. 
• Address end user privacy and confidentiality issues (Liberty Alliance, n.d.) 
2.9 Conclusion 
Organisations are now viewing identity management as a solution to a multitude of security 
challenges.  However organisations need to consider how they can ensure the benefits and 
value of an identity management system within their business.  Due to the poor amount of 
documentation on new systems and the functionality that they may possess, often when a 
new system is designed it is built completely from the ground up.  Frequently businesses are 
unaware that there are already built components which can be applied to their new systems in 
order to share common functionality and security concerns.  This wastes both time and 
money in continuously re-inventing the wheel.  When a framework for identity management 
is used correctly on new identity management systems, it provides clear goals, strategy, 
policies, identity management architecture, specifications and a road map of how to reach 
those goals.  This provides a strong base for successful, business-driven and clearly 
understood identity management. 
 
In this chapter the concepts of identity management were discussed.  It was shown that the 
information that is stored within an identity is of great value and needs to be protected.  The 
management of an identity is of equal importance.  Companies should make use of the 
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identity management life cycle to ensure that identities are adequately protected while under 
their care and removed when they are no longer required.  The aims for identity management 
within the public and private sector were discussed.  From this analysis the need for fraud 
prevention and the integrity, confidentiality and accessibility of this information was found to 
be a requirement in both systems.  The benefits of making use of an identity management 
solution were found to be vast, depending on the nature of the system and the expected 
outcomes. 
 
In essence identity management should be viewed as a modern day tool for the management 
of customer and user transactions in the online environment.  The use of identity 
management is stipulated as a need for compliance with government laws and best practices 
of the industry.  Identity management can be used as a tool to manage the business and 
protect it from risk.  Now that the elements of an identity and the importance of the 
management of that identity have been discussed, Chapter 3 will focus on the management of 
the authentication and access of users. 
 
Chapter 3 builds on the concepts outlined in this chapter, by looking at the role of access and 
authentication management of identities, and how the levels of trust of customers and website 
vendors can be increased through adherence to compliancy standards and proper access 
management processes. 
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Chapter 3 
ACCESS & AUTHENTICATION MANAGEMENT 
In order to effectively manage a business environment in which multiple users are in need of 
accessing systems over large distributed networks, it is imperative for the security of the 
business to ensure that the users who connect to this environment are whom they claim to be.  
A 1993 edition of The New Yorker contained a cartoon by Peter Steiner in which a dog 
explains to another dog the advantages of the Internet.  The dog specifies plainly that, “on the 
Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”  This cartoon asks the question of how important is 
the knowledge of an identity to a vendor/system administrator.  Would the vendor still sell a 
product to an entity if they were aware that the customer was a dog, lacking the ability to pay 
for the items or services?  Due to the risks involved a vendor would not enter into an 
agreement if they knew the customer was an animal.  The Internet has the ability to mask an 
identity and in doing this opens up all forms of possibilities.  It can then be concluded that 
due to the lack of definitive online identity, every action that is performed online is subject to 
a certain amount of risk.  A merchant may not be overly concerned about the identity of their 
customers if the possibility of failure of payment is small however in order to reduce the 
possibility of failure for payment a higher level of trust between the merchant and the user 
needs to be insured.  A business may be more concerned with the authorisation of their 
customers than their authenticity.  The role of trust plays a great role in the relationship 
between the buyer and the seller and it is important to understand the role of trust in an online 
environment. 
 
This chapter will look into the concepts of managing the trust of users and website owners in 
the building of a strong relationship of trust between the two parties.  The roles of access 
control and the benefits for better protecting client information are presented.  Along with 
access control the issues of accountability and access control techniques are presented to 
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provide an insight into the need for compliance within access control and the benefits 
through this process.  The chapter begins with a look into the role of trust management and 
the importance of ensuring high levels of trust between user and business owner. 
3.1 Trust Management 
The concept of trust is invaluable to both merchants and consumers.  The definition of trust 
from the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) is “Confidence in or reliance on some quality or 
attribute of a person or thing”.  In the online environment there is a large amount of doubt 
from both the merchant and the customer as to the validity of both individuals.  In real life 
business deals are negotiated via means of paper-based contracts or face to face verbal 
agreements.  All of these means are valid as there is a means of legal recourse should the 
business deal go sour.  On the Internet, as mentioned previously, there is no proof that an 
entity is who they claim to be.  This lack of fundamental trust has spread into the traditionally 
most secure of environments, the banking sector.  In a recent report by Computer Fraud and 
Security it was stated that 52% of respondents were unlikely to sign up to use online banking, 
as well as reports that 82% of respondents would not respond to any mail from financial 
firms (Consumers losing trust in online banking: survey, 2007). 
 
The Internet’s e-commerce is based on a virtual environment in the way in which it has very 
few physical attributes and offers limited social markers, which makes the customers’ 
assessment of the trustworthiness of a vendor rather difficult.  In online commerce, 
customers take on substantial amounts of risk when making purchases from an online vendor.  
This is due to all encounters taking place through the vendor’s website.  It is important for 
customers to assess the risks that can occur when purchasing online.  Through previous 
studies it has been shown that the level of trust affects the customer’s intention to purchase 
online.  Customers on a vendor’s website often leave the website when they believe they do 
not have sufficient trust (Chau, Hu, Lee & Au, 2006). 
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It is important for online vendors to build strong relationships with their customers to ensure 
that customers continue to return and make use of their services.  In order to secure this trust, 
it is imperative that vendors make use of proper access control procedures to provide the 
minimal risk to their customers. 
3.2 Access Control 
Access control is defined by Lopez, Oppliger and Pernul as the, “prevention of unauthorised 
use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorised manner” 
(2004).  Within the realm of computer security, based upon this definition, access control 
includes the authentication and authorisation processes involved in a sign-in event.  Within 
the online environment access control makes use of biometric scans and digital signatures 
and certificates. 
 
The control of access to resources and restricted functions within systems is a major 
component in system security.  The requirements for an access control model are summarised 
as follows: 
• Access control models must be easy to use and transparent to end users. 
• The effects of access control procedures on the rest of the system need to be 
clearly understood. 
• Access control models have to allow for complex access policies at different 
levels of implementation. 
• Models need to be sufficiently flexible to allow for specification, delegation, 
revocation and overall management of access policies at runtime. 
• Models need to provide strong protection in shared user environments. 
• Models may grant access by considering the current context of the user (Lopez, 
Oppliger & Pernul, 2004). 
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These requirements can also be interpreted as best practices for the setup of any access 
control process.  The implementation of an access control system is based on the policy 
implementation of the business.  Like company policies, the reasons for implementation of 
access control procedures need to be fully understood by staff and users in order attain the 
desired level of benefit by management. 
 
Access control is built on a set of authorisations which are given as directives through the 
security policy.  These authorisations state that specific subjects (defined as a user or 
process) are allowed to perform specific functions or actions (defined as an access mode) to a 
specified object (defined as a resource of the system).  The traditional approach of static 
authorisation through which a subject takes an action on an object, is best suited for basic 
traditional systems, but fails during implementation on more complex systems.  More forms 
of authorisations need to be made available such as content-based authorisation, constraint 
based authorisation and negative authorisation (Cuppens, Cuppens-Boulahia & Ghorbel, 
2007). 
 
Access control models used in modern systems fall into one of two categories, those based on 
capabilities and those based on access control lists.  In a capability-based model, the 
possession of a capability to an object provides access to the object via a secure channel.  In 
an access control list model, the subject’s access to an object is dependant on whether the 
identity’s access is found on an approved list.  These lists can be edited to provide user 
access to required resources. 
Access control systems provide the essential services of: 
• Identification and authentication – Unique identification of the user via use of a 
username or some other distinct identification, and authentication via verifying 
the claimed identity by use of a password or other forms of authentication 
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• Authorisation to determine what a user or subject can do on the system, such as 
read and write access and ability to execute applications within the context of the 
security policy and system rules 
• Accountability to keep track of what actions a subject performed 
3.2.1 Accountability 
For all uses of an access control mechanism or procedure the keeping of a history of the 
access controls and audit logs of actions performed by users is of high importance.  This 
information is vital for use in potential legal proceedings and in the tracking down of 
problems within systems determining who performed what action.  A large portion of the 
accountability and audit trails are implemented due to legal requirements within compliancy 
issues. 
 
A regulative system requires the entities that make use of it, to be able to be uniquely 
identified so they can be held accountable for their actions.  It is not possible to ensure 
accountability in applications where there is no implementation of identity controls.  
Applications that only make use of a username for user authentication only provide a weak 
measure for accountability insurance.  In such applications users can have multiple identities 
in the system at the same point in time.  The user is then also able to disappear and reappear 
in the system with another identity without being properly restricted.  Introduction of 
mechanisms which measure accountability are based on a scoring model.  These mechanisms 
may provide the users with economic incentives to retain the same identity for a prolonged 
period of time.  Implementations of enterprise applications normally require users to make 
use of the system under their real identities.  In these cases users are requested to identify 
themselves by making use of public key certificates which are then matched against their 
legal identities (Firozabadi & Sergot, 2002). 
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Continuous review of access logs and storage of the access logs in a secure and consistent 
manner is required should any of that information be required as evidence in a legal suit.  
Automated alerts should be sent to system administrators in order to ensure that unauthorised 
user actions are logged.  Examples of this would be more than three failed log in attempts in 
a specified period or use of a disabled user account.  Alerts on these forms of unauthorised or 
suspect actions can allow security administrators to identify what went wrong and how best 
to combat it in the future, as well as watch for illegal attacks. 
3.2.2 Access Control Techniques 
There are a number of access control models and approaches to handling the problem.  
Access controls are described as either discretionary or mandatory. 
3.2.2.1 Discretionary Access Control 
Discretionary access control (DAC) means that each object within the system has an owner, 
and that owner chooses the access control policy assigned to it.  A number of objects in 
Windows make use of this security model (Tavares, 2004). 
Access controls can be discretionary within Access Control Lists, capability-based or role 
based access control systems. 
3.2.2.2 Mandatory Access Control 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) ensures that an organisation’s security policy is enforced 
without user compliance from an application.  The assigning of security labels to information 
is correlated against the level of security a user has access to.  Overall MAC mechanisms are 
more secure than DAC but contain trade-offs in performance and user convenience.  A MAC 
model contains one or more of the attributes: 
• Only administrators make changes to security labels 
• All data is assigned a security level reflecting its value for protection 
• Users read from a lower classification than their security level and up to their 
security level 
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• All users can write to higher classifications 
• Users are given access to objects only of the same classification that they are 
authorised to view 
• Access is based on labelling of the resource and user’s credentials 
• Access is based on the security of the client (Open Web Application Security 
Project, 2002) 
 
Ultimately the process of access control is as strong as its weakest link.  A system 
implemented with the strongest of authentication and access control mechanisms fails 
completely if the groundwork is not controlled by system administrators and support staff 
such as human resources. 
3.2.3 Life Cycle Management and Human Resources 
An alarming trend when viewing access rights that users possess is the way in which they are 
managed.  Human Resources departments need to take a deeper look into how they control 
employee’s roles in their course of working for a company.  Currently when looking at the 
management of user identity, many companies are not efficient in the way in which they 
handle user roles. 
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Figure 3.1 – Current Employee Life Cycle – Access to accounts (Young, 2004) 
Figure 3.1 shows how when an employee is selected for a role, general access requests are 
granted, an example is accessing the main system’s network.  In some instances certain 
requests are granted before the user is even at the company, in order for them to be 
productive from their first day.  Over the course of the employee’s employment, certain 
access rights are increased in order for the employee to fulfil his/her work functions.  
However the graph shows that as the employee’s work responsibilities increase, there are 
very few privileges being removed.  This process ends when the employee leaves the 
organisation, but even after the employee leaves the organisation there are, on a number of 
occasions, privileges that still remain.  This results in a number of potential issues, including: 
• Open access to privileges that the user may no longer need to perform their job 
function. 
• Orphaned accounts in target systems. 
• Administrative overhead in system clean-ups. 
• Assets not returned when user no longer needs them. 
• IT roles and permissions have no relation to HR roles. 
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• Difficulty in determining a common provisioning policy for employees and 
contractors (Young, 2004). 
It is clear that in order to clean up this inefficiency, account privileges that are based on 
user’s roles are implemented.  Should such an implementation take place, the graph would 
look as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Role Based Access Management (Young, 2004) 
As users change their job roles within the organisation, their account privileges will then 
either be cut or expanded, but upon leaving the company all, account privileges are then 
completely removed.  It is imperative for successful identity management on the environment 
for HR to comply with the process, which can significantly reduce administration overhead, 
streamline business process and help enforce security policy for IT systems within identity 
management (Young, 2004). 
3.3 Compliance 
With the huge boom to the world of marketing and advertising that the Internet has provided, 
with it has come a large number of legal issues needing to be addressed.  Rights to an 
individual’s privacy and personal information need to be protected.  These areas are closely 
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looked at in the way companies protect their information through the use of COBIT and 
ITIL.  The process of authentication is the point at which the identity meets the world.  The 
challenge for identity and access management solutions is to provide authentication methods 
whose strength is appropriate to the inherent threats that they face. 
 
Two core themes of compliance have however been set out in the focus areas that are 
addressed by identity and access management solutions.  These are the need for organisations 
to protect the data of the individual stored on their systems, and secondly the mitigation of 
risk arising from unauthorised access to organisational processes and information. 
 
Figure 3.3 - Elements Comprising an Access Management Solution (Rodger, 2004) 
Figure 3.3 shows examples of the elements that make up an identification & access 
management solution.  The foundation of all the elements is a secure repository for the 
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identity information.  This element is the most important as the use of identity is the basis for 
the protection of other resources and thereby requires that the information must be guarded 
safely.  A common approach within a number of I&AM solutions is to allow organisations 
directory resources to be leveraged, as these are well protected from malicious access and 
provide the backbone of existing identity activities.  Directories can be used as large identity 
repositories, whilst being suitable for compliance because of their high levels of security 
(Rodger, 2004). 
 
It is now accepted that the username and password mechanism is no longer a secure 
authentication option.  It is important for organisations to look ahead for a multi-tiered 
authentication strategy to protect information assets.  In this approach other forms of 
authentication can be used as enhancements to the username and password approach, each 
providing a factor of the overall authentication.  The adoption of a multiple factor 
authentication enhances the security of the assets that need to be protected, and by reducing 
the risk that arises from these threats a number of compliancy issues are resolved.  
Compliance requirements dictate that only authorised people should be able to access 
information (Rodger, 2004). 
3.4 Conclusion 
Merchants store a particularly large amount of information online.  This information is used 
for user preferences on purchasing as well as delivery information and contact details of 
customers.  From the merchant’s perspective there is not much concern about the overall 
identity of the individual but more so their ability to pay for the service.  However regulatory 
bodies have put large amounts of effort into ensuring that a user’s information is kept secure 
and is used in the correct way.  Should the security be breached it is then imperative that 
accurate logs exist in order to identify what actions took place under that user’s identity.  
This would be useful in cases where prosecution is required. 
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Having looked into access control and authentication management and how they should be 
applied, the next chapter will begin to look at the overall design and implementation of three 
industry models for implementation of an identity management solution to the single sign on 
problem.  These three models are the Mozilla TrustBar, the Liberty Alliances Federated 
Identity model and the use of Microsoft Passport .NET as solutions. 
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Chapter 4 
COMPARISON OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 
The ultimate dream of the computer scientist and practitioner is one in which computer 
systems know who their users are.  This ideology is based on the concept that users should be 
authenticated to a computer system as simply as possible.  Furthermore based on that 
authentication of the user, systems must authorise those users and control access to system 
resources accordingly.  The dream is seen with many names: Single Sign-On (SSO), Single 
Sign-In (SSI), authentication and authorisation infrastructures (AAI), privilege management 
infrastructures, etc.  The umbrella term that is most frequently used to cover all of these cases 
is identity management.  This study has shown the different dangers that are inherent in the 
online environment.  These dangers are briefly summarised as spoofing, phishing and 
identity theft of client details.  The aim of this chapter is to look into the processes involved 
in the different forms of identity management solutions for the Internet.  A look at 
Microsoft’s Passport .NET is taken in order to see the approach suggested by recognised 
industry leaders in Microsoft.  The Liberty Alliance’s view is then analysed to determine best 
practices from the rest of the industry.  Finally the chapter moves on to an investigation of 
identity management from the view of the user, to determine how to best protect the user 
from other forms of attacks in Mozilla TrustBar. 
4.1 Microsoft Passport .NET 
As part of Microsoft’s .NET initiative, a set of Web services was introduced including a user 
authentication and SSI service called Microsoft .NET Passport.  This service was released in 
1999 and is one of the most widely used services of its kind.  It is used within the Microsoft 
Hotmail Service, a free online email facility (Lopez, Oppliger, & Pernul, 2004). 
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Microsoft is well known as the market based leaders for a number of technologies.  Globally 
they possess the possible infrastructure in order to support a large effort such as a unified 
single sign-on methodology. 
4.1.1 Passport Model 
The Passport .NET service makes use of a Single-Sign-On Identity Domain.  This is an 
extension of the Common User Identity Model as shown in Figure 4.1.  The identifier and 
credential indexes in the figures refer to the issuing entity.  For example, an identifier and 
credential with an index of 1 mean that they have been issued by Service Provider (SP) 1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Common User Identity Model (Jøsang & Pope, 2005) 
The principle of the Common User Identity Model lies in having a separate authority 
structure in place that acts exclusively as an identifier for users as well as providing user 
credentials to other service providers.  Through this model a user can access all service 
providers by making use of just one set of user identifiers and credentials.  This system may 
be implemented via use of a primary key identifier (PKI) in which a single Certification 
Authority (CA) issues certificates to all users within the domain.  The identifier name can be 
a set of email addresses that are globally unique.  Users in this case would only need a single 
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identifier and credential to be authenticated by all service providers within the domain of the 
CA.  The underlying working of this model is the basis for the operation of the single sign-on 
Identity Domain incorporated in Microsoft Passport .NET (Jøsang & Pope, 2005). 
 
There are inherent problems in the possible setup of such a model.  The use of email 
addresses for the purpose of user identification is a risky proposal.  Email addresses are not 
necessarily unique identifiers of users.  Users can have multiple e-mail addresses, and the 
unique identifier for users can be relatively easily retrieved by potential users wishing to 
commit fraud.  Other problems in the setup of an SSO environment is the lack of defence in 
the sign on procedure.  With the use of multiple authentication and sign-on requirements 
across websites, should one set of user credentials be compromised, only that login and 
information contained within it can be affected.  Should the user credentials of a SSO be 
compromised, all websites which make use of those user credentials are compromised, 
thereby threatening the user identity further.  The .NET framework operates from the SSO 
identity model which allows for a user set identifier. 
 
Figure 4.2 SSO Identity Domain Model (Jøsang & Pope, 2005) 
The Single-Sign-On Identity Domain Model shown in Figure 4.2 shows how a user may be 
authenticated by making use of only one service provider.  This single service provider, once 
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user authentication has taken place, then allows other service providers to consider that user 
has been authenticated.  The approach to this is known as a Single Sign-On (SSO) solution as 
the user only needs to authenticate their identity once in order to access all services they 
should have authority to use.  In this form of implementation, there is only one party 
responsible for the allocation of identifiers, issuing of user credentials and the performing of 
the authentication.  This SSO implementation is very similar to that of the federated identifier 
concept used by the Liberty Alliance, however, no mapping of user identifiers is needed.  
This is due to the same identifier being used in every service provider.  Through this process, 
once a user has been authenticated through the single login provider, all affiliated websites to 
the .NET Passport will consider the user as authenticated should they attempt to access them.  
This process lasts for a specified amount of time till the session times out, then a new login 
by the user is required (Jøsang & Pope, 2005). 
 
Microsoft overall is ideally suited for the process of handling an SSO platform.  Microsoft 
already provides a large number of services online for e-mail, online chatting, and searching 
facilities.  Through the use of this already existing infrastructure Microsoft could increase 
their business footprint.  Ultimately what would be requested from users would be a form of 
non-profit organisation that would be tasked with the setup and maintenance of a global SSO 
identity framework solution.  However there would be some issues should such an 
implementation take place.  Issues concerning user privacy and freedom of movement online 
could be infringed should a single entity take control of all SSO authentication and the 
information held therein, and be compromised either by an illegal party or from government 
organisations. 
 
Now that the form of model that the .NET Passport implements has been presented, the 
overall implementation of the principles of this model can be better understood by looking 
further into how users make use of the .NET passport and the underlying methodology 
behind it. 
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4.1.2 User Registration 
When a request for registration for a Passport at a specific website is made, two separate 
accounts are created at the same time.  Through the use of a single form the user opens an 
account with the website owner as well as one with Passport.  All information that would be 
recorded under the owner website is sent from the Passport service upon registration to the 
owner website with all the profile information normally entered at registration.  An overview 
of the registration process is shown in figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 – The Registration Process (Microsoft, 2004c) 
1. User browses to Site A, a participating website or service and clicks the “Sign In” 
button (or attempts to register). 
2. The user is redirected to a registration page displaying the registration fields required 
by Site A.  (The minimum number of fields required is two: email address and 
password.)  The user can choose whether or not they will share their information with 
other Passport enabled websites that they sign into. 
3. The user reads and accepts the terms of use, and submits the form. 
4. The user is then redirected back to Site A with their encrypted authentication ticket 
and profile information attached. 
5. Site A decrypts the authentication ticket and profile information and continues their 
registration process, or grants access to their website. 
 
Information that is unrelated to a customer’s Passport profile is only stored on Site A and is 
not shared with the Passport profile.  Site A also does not receive any information that relates 
to the Passport system.  Passwords, secret questions and answers, security keys and other 
  48 
customer credential information are not shared in order to maintain the security of the user’s 
authentication data.  The Passport profile only makes use of information that will ease 
possible further registrations.  Examples of this sort of information would be Country, Postal 
code and Time Zone (Microsoft, 2004c). 
 
Lopez, Oppliger & Pernul (2004) further describes the information that is stored per user 
account, mentioning that each .NET Passport account can include the following components: 
 Passport Unique Identifier (PUID) which is a 64-bit numeric value assigned by the 
.NET Passport Service when an account is created 
 Passport user profile containing user’s e-mail address or phone number, first and last 
names, and demographic information for the user, as well as the user password (a 
minimum of 6 characters) 
 Optional secret questions created by the user, along with their answers, are stored to 
be used with a possible reset of the user password 
 An additional 4 digit security key is used when users attempt to access websites that 
require a strong credential sign-in.  This security is only created the first time a user 
accesses a website that requires a stronger set of user credentials 
The standard listed credentials are the minimum amount of information that is required for a 
user to have a .NET Passport.  In all cases the amount of information that is requested from 
the user upon registration depends on the website where they request to register, as well as 
any information that they would want to share with other Passport participating websites 
during sign in.  Information that is not needed by the Passport service is only stored on the 
vendor’s website and not by the Passport service. 
4.1.3 Passport .NET Authentication 
The Passport authentication messages are passed in the form of electronic “tickets” that are 
used to inform websites that the user has successfully signed in.  A ticket which is stored in 
the form of a cookie contains information on the date and time of sign in, and the date and 
time of the last manual sign in.  In order to receive this information the user has to 
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authenticate them through the use of the .NET Passport.  The process followed is shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 – The Passport Authentication Process (Microsoft, 2004c) 
1. User browses to participating website or service (Site A in this example).  User clicks 
“Sign In” button or link. 
2. User is redirected to Passport. 
3. Passport checks if the user has a “Ticket Granting Cookie” (TGC) in their browser’s 
cookie file (one that meets the rules that Site A has set).  If one is detected they skip 
to Step 4 and never see the Passport login UI.  If the TGC does not satisfy the time 
since sign in rule requested by Site A, then Passport removes information that Site A 
passed on the query string and redirects the user to a page that asks for the currently 
signed in user’s password.  This new page has a short URL in the Passport.NET 
domain.  If the user enters the correct information, they proceed. 
4. The user is redirected back to Site A with their encrypted authentication ticket and 
profile information attached (if the user has chosen to share it, and if it is present). 
5. Site A decrypts authentication ticket and profile information, and signs the customer 
into their website. 
6. User accesses the page, resource or service they requested from Site A. 
NOTE:  Sites B and C do not receive any information in this process.  No information about 
a user is shared with Sites B and C unless the user chooses to sign in at those websites. 
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In order to attain a ticket, the user clicks on the Passport sign in logo in the website.  This 
will then redirect the user to a special page on Passport.com.  This page takes information 
from the website that directed the user to that location, from the URL and assigns it a unique 
website ID.  This process allows Passport to know which website referred the user, and to 
which website the user needs to be returned.  Once the login details have been processed, 
Passport redirects the user to a page on Passport.net. 
 
There are 2 reasons for this internal redirection within Passport.  Firstly, through this process 
the URL is shortened in order for the user to verify that the page address is owned by 
Passport.  The second reason is in order to separate the user interface from the domain in 
which the authentication cookies were originally written.  This process helps to prevent 
unauthorised access to these cookies, as browsers only allow for the reading of cookies 
which have been written in the same website currently being accessed.  The whole process of 
the redirection takes place in a matter of seconds, and once completed returns to the 
requesting website. 
 
Upon return to the requesting website, the user has attached two encrypted packets of 
information within the returning query string.  Website owners making use of the Passport 
service would need to install Passport Manager.  This application reads the packets that have 
returned with the user and writes them as encrypted cookies in the owner’s website domain.  
The first of these cookies contains the authentication ticket information.  The second contains 
profile information that the user selected, as well as operational information and unique 
identifiers that need to be passed.  These packets are encrypted with a unique secret key 
which is shared between Passport and the owner website.  The owner website then takes the 
information and uses it to issue its own cookies. 
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When the user navigates to another Passport participating website, the new website has 
multiple options on how to authenticate the new user.  When a user clicks the sign in button, 
they are once again directed to the Passport sign in page.  The difference now is that there is 
a ticket-granting cookie saved on the web browser that Passport can read.  Because the 
cookie ticket contains the time that it was issued, it allows the referring website to decide the 
timeframe that the website needs to consider the cookie as safe enough to use.  If the cookie 
ticket is too old the user is then prompted to re-enter their credentials. 
 
Each website may choose how old the ticket-granting cookie is before they will reject it.  
They also have the option of forcing users to re-enter their password.  This eliminates the 
ability of someone who does not know the user’s password to access the user’s information.  
Through this process there is variance in the protocols for ensuring the user’s ticket cookie is 
valid, and potential security holes are opened for user information to be compromised. 
 
A potentially hazardous feature to the user of .NET Passport, reported by both the Microsoft 
(2004c) and discussed by Kormann & Rubin (2000) is that of the automatic sign in of 
Passport.  If this option is selected the username and password of the individual user are 
stored locally on the individual’s client machine.  With an automatic sign in selected the user 
will be signed on to the .NET Passport service without their intervention whenever they 
make use of the machine.  Even disconnecting from the Internet or turning the machine off 
has no effect to the user remaining connected to the service. 
 
Although a user may use their .NET Passport account at multiple websites, the password is 
only stored in the .NET Passport database, and is only shared with the .NET Passport servers 
that need to make use of it for authentication.  The .NET Passport service possesses a facility 
which, should a user make an error in attempting to sign in, .NET Passport then 
automatically blocks access to the user account for a few minutes in order to stop attempts 
for password cracking software being used to gain unlawful access to the account. 
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When the user wishes to sign out, the .NET Passport server checks the websites that the user 
has visited through the visited websites cookie.  .NET Passport then redirects the client’s 
browser to each visited website and requests each website to execute a script deleting the 
cookies that those websites created at sign-in.  Unless a user makes use of the option for 
automatically connecting to the Passport service, all .NET Passport cookies are session based 
and are deleted when that session is closed.  If a user makes use of the automatic sign in 
option, the cookies are persistent and are not deleted if the browser is closed.  Through the 
user of the expiration of user authentication related cookies, Passport ensures that user 
information is not stored indefinitely on the client machine. 
 
Overall the .NET Passport solution provides a relatively simple solution to the problems 
experienced by users within SSO.  Websites affiliated with the .NET Passport program can 
opt to have the service manage their user base, shifting responsibility for this process from 
the individual website to Microsoft.  The major disadvantage of the .NET Passport solution is 
the problem of having a single entity being responsible for all identity authentication tasks.  
Should a government request information from the entity, it opens up the user to privacy 
issues. 
 
The Liberty Alliance’s Federated User Identity is a concept which is a form of competition to 
Microsoft’s .NET Passport. 
4.2 Liberty Alliance Federated User Identity 
The Liberty Alliance is a body that is defining specifications for networked identity 
management.  The Alliance is an undertaking by a group of organisations and government 
agencies, in order to provide open technical specifications for a federated identity.  When the 
Liberty Alliance began their operations, the first phase of development involved the setting 
up of specifications which enabled simplified single sign-on for end users.  This process 
became Liberty’s Identity Federation Framework (Madsen 2004). 
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The use of multiple respected organisations and government agencies allows for a well-
rounded set of specifications for the identity management.  The problem with an 
implementation such as that of Microsoft’s .NET Passport is that all the specifications have 
been set up by Microsoft.  Although they are the industry leader, one corporation’s view on a 
topic is not necessarily the best for a solution.  Hence, the underlying concept for the Liberty 
Alliance is a consortium made up of leading industry companies, such as Sun Microsystems, 
to discuss and decide on a best practice to become the industry standard. 
4.2.1 Federated User Identity Model 
The identity federation concept can be defined as the set of agreements, standards and 
technologies that enable a group of service providers to recognise the user identifiers and 
entitlements from other service providers within a federated domain.  Through the use of a 
federated identity domain, service providers establish agreements with other service 
providers in order that identities from different service provider specific identity domains are 
recognised across all domains.  The agreements set up by these service providers include 
policy and technology standards to be used by the parties.  A mapping is established between 
the different identifiers owned by the same client in their different domains in order to link 
the identities (Jøsang & Pope, 2005). 
The result of this process is a single virtual identity domain as shown in the figure below: 
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Figure 4.5 Federated User Identity Model (Jøsang & Pope, 2005) 
The federation of an isolated user identifier provides the client signing in to the service, the 
view that there is only a single identifier domain.  The client user can possess their own 
separate identifiers for each of the respective service providers, although the client does not 
need to possess all of the identifiers for sign in.  The reason is because the user possesses a 
known credential which is sufficient for him to receive access to all services within the 
federated domain.  The inherent problem with this form of model is that users still have to 
manage multiple identities and credentials, even though the user is not actively using all of 
those identities.  Therefore, the process of identity federation will be most successful when 
the user wants to manage only one set of identifiers and credentials. 
 
The core differences between the Federated User Identity Model in Figure 4.5 and the SSO 
Identity Domain Model in Figure 4.2, is the user identity and credential evaluator.  In Figure 
4.2 there is a single entity responsible for the identification and authentication of all users 
within the system.  In figure 4.5 multiple user identity and credential evaluators may exist.  
Once a user is authenticated by one system within this federated domain, all other websites 
within that federated domain can verify the user as being authentic. 
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Having reviewed the concept behind the model for the Liberty Alliance implementation of a 
SSO solution for users, a review of the process involved for the successful sign-on of a user 
needs to be identified. 
4.2.2 Liberty Alliance Single Sign-On procedure 
The Liberty specifications for Single Sign-on are an enabler to provide single sign-on 
functionality across different enterprise domains and websites.  The use of a browser only 
authentication method is considered essential for acceptance by users within the market as 
users frequently switch browsers. 
 
Figure 4.6 - Browser based single sign on (Pfitzmann, 2004) 
Pfitzmann (2004) describes the process of Liberty’s Single Sign-On as follows:       
A user accesses the service provider via browsing online.  When submitting a log in request, 
the service provider redirects the user’s browser to the identity provider of the user.  The user 
then logs in through use of a typical user ID and password.  The browser and identity 
provider may, under certain circumstances, reuse a secure session from a recent login.  The 
identity provider then redirects the browser back to the service provider with an additional 
ticket, to handle other services such as data transfer logistics on other channels.  The term of 
single sign on is only used if a login name or other private user details are transferred. 
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The benefit to the user shown in this form of implementation is that the user does not have to 
be redirected to a separate login page for the purpose of authenticating the user.  When the 
user is then authenticated from one service within the circle of trust, all other websites within 
that trust domain can verify that the user has been authenticated on a sister website and 
eliminate the need for sign in. 
 
The Liberty Alliance provides a viable alternative to the solution to the .NET Passport.  By 
having a consortium of companies involved in the setting of standards, a broader level of 
consensus is achieved and the best solution is implemented.  Within the realm of SSO the 
issue with Liberty Alliance is the lack of ability to provide a scalable solution for a user to 
connect to a multitude of websites.  This is due to each setup of the Federated identity 
solution existing within separate circles of trust.  If a user moves between 2 different circles, 
he or she would be required to reconnect and sign-in with different credentials.  From the 
analysis of two solutions tasked with the identification and authentication of the user 
credentials, the responsibility is now moved onto the identification and authentication of the 
accessed website by the user.  This is done through an investigation of the Mozilla TrustBar. 
4.3 Mozilla TrustBar 
The Mozilla TrustBar is a current implementation of the Personal Service Provider Identity 
model.  The TrustBar is a plug-in toolbar used within the Mozilla and Firefox browsers, 
through which a user can store images mapped to server certificates.  Whenever a server 
certificate is verified, the toolbar checks that a mapping exists, and displays the mapped 
image on the toolbar while the corresponding page is still being loaded (Jøsang & Pope, 
2005).  The analysis of the Mozilla TrustBar is from a different perspective than that of the 
service provider authentication methodology.  A large focus is placed on how to secure user 
authentication processes.  This endeavour only solves the risks inherent in the sign-on 
process of the user, and does not cater for the potential user problems of phishing or website 
spoofing.  The underlying objective of the TrustBar implementation is to make users more 
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aware of the security behind the pages that they view.  TrustBar allows users a quick and 
easy way to visually authenticate the website they are viewing. 
4.3.1 Personal Service Provider Identity Model 
Through the use of a form of Personal Authentication Device (PAD), in the case of the 
TrustBar the PAD is the client browser, users can generate private identifiers service 
providers by mapping the domain name of the website and other unique identifiers to 
personally chosen identifiers for the same website.  The identifier can be anything that can be 
recognised, such as text, pictures and sound.  This concept is illustrated in Figure 4.7 below: 
 
Figure 4.7 Personal Service Provider Identity Model (Jøsang & Pope, 2005). 
The index “4” of the identifier and the credential contained in the messages of Figure 4.7 
indicates that they were assigned by the centralised identifier and credentials provider with 
the same index, which when used in practice can be a Certificate Authority or a Primary Key 
Identifier index.  The PKI indexes are shown at “1”, “2” and “3” of the SP identifiers 
depicted within the personal domain of each of the users, indicating that they have been 
individually assigned by the respective users.  The mapping between the global SP identifier 
and the personal SP identifier of the user, takes place in the user domain.  In order for this to 
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be practical, the user’s PAD needs to be directly involved in the authentication protocol 
(Jøsang & Pope, 2005). 
 
The design of TrustBar allows for users to set up their own identifier for each domain.  In the 
setup for this process they can map pictures or text to these visual identifiers.  When a 
browser then accesses the requested website, the user can then expect to see the visual 
identifier for the website that they set up.  This allows for an easy method of confirming that 
a website is authentic.  In order to fully understand the possible benefits behind the use of the 
TrustBar implementation, the authentication process of the retrieved websites must be 
analysed. 
4.3.2 TrustBar Authentication 
The overall process of the client user authentication on the server attempts to protect the user 
from potential eavesdropping and modification by Man in the Middle (MITM) adversaries.  
Large portions of financial and other websites make use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) to authenticate the user.  A number of those websites only 
make use of the SSL or TLS protocols only after the user has typed in a username and 
password, and clicked ‘submit’ (Herzberg, 2005). 
 
This form of implementation provides the potential for a MITM to redirect the user to a 
modified version of the same page.  Should this occur, the user can unknowingly release 
username and password information to a third party through this page.  However, the 
modified page has been changed in order to send the user information back to the MITM.  It 
is clear that the traditional approach to a sign-on methodology does not protect the user from 
these forms of attacks to their information, and that the user requires an easier way to 
confirm they are at the website they intended to be. 
 
Herzberg (2005) mentions the ways in which TrustBar provides a solution to the client user 
problem: 
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 TrustBar periodically downloads a list of the unprotected login websites that is 
maintained on the Mozilla TrustBar servers.  This list contains all the unprotected 
login websites which Mozilla track, and any alternate login pages for those websites 
that are protected.  This can be used to redirect the client should an unsafe link be 
found.  There is a trend amongst these websites that when a user accesses one of the 
unprotected pages, they are automatically redirected to an alternate login page that is 
protected. 
 TrustBar makes allowance for users to assign a name or logo to websites of their own 
choosing to visually identify the website.  TrustBar computes a hash of all 
unprotected websites for which the user has assigned a name or a logo.  TrustBar 
compares this hash on subsequent access to the same website.  Should the website not 
have been modified in five consequent accesses, TrustBar begins to display a “Same 
since” and a date value.  When the website eventually changes a warning is then 
displayed when the page is again accessed.  As most login pages are structured to just 
perform the login function, they are not prone to constant change.  This can be helpful 
to users as they can then immediately notice any change to these generally static 
pages. 
 
Herzberg and Gbara (2007) provide further uses of TrustBar for solving the user problem 
through the following items: 
 In SSL and TLS protected websites, TrustBar shows, by default, the name of the 
organization that owns the website through the identification from the digital 
certificate.  TrustBar also displays a representation of the logo or the name of the 
certificate authority who issued the certificate. 
 With unprotected websites, TrustBar presents the domain name. 
 TrustBar displays a padlock for all protected websites, with the same icon but with a 
“No Entry” sign over the padlock for unprotected websites. 
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Mozilla TrustBar solution to the user’s web usage condition is novel.  The service provides 
the client with a free facility that can make the user feel far more secure in their online 
service usage.  By providing a visual aid to the user of the current status of the website they 
are visiting, it gives the user the ability to visibly identify the security available on the 
website.  This will improve the user’s overall experience and provide them with a measure of 
self protection from potential spoofing attacks. 
4.4 Comparison  
The three models reviewed thus far in this chapter have different perspectives in their 
approach to the handling of identity management.  All the examples chosen have their 
limitations, since they are not easily comparable.  It is not possible to provide a valid 
comparison of the .NET Passport system which was implemented with a singular 
methodology, to the Liberty Alliance framework.  The reason for this is that the latter is not 
so much a system, but rather a set of open technical standards that any network of 
organisations can implement.  Every single sign-on implementation based on the Liberty 
Alliance framework can be scrutinised, but the efficiency of these systems is only as strong 
as the level to which the specifications are applied.  Further complicating this analysis is the 
Mozilla TrustBar.  The TrustBar looks at the identity management paradigm from a 
completely alternate perspective, that of the user.  TrustBar implements similar steps when 
authenticating, but instead of the authentication of the user, authentication of the website 
being accessed is performed.  The consolidated comparisons, where they can be drawn, are 
shown in Table 4.1 below: 
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 .NET Passport 
(Lopez, Oppliger & Pernul, 2004) 
Liberty Alliance 
(Olsen & Mahler, 2007) 
Mozilla TrustBar 
(Herzberg, 2005) 
System Singular System 
implemented by Microsoft 
Open Specifications with various 
forms of implementation on multiple 
different systems. 
Single System 
implemented by Mozilla 
to handle classification of 
web addresses 
Single  
Sign-On 
Previously multi-
organisation single sign-
on.  Since 2003 single-
organisation sign-on 
Implementation dependant, 
supporting  multi-organisation SSO 
Single verification of 
websites accessed by user 
Choice of 
Identity 
Providers 
Microsoft was the only 
identity provider 
Allows several identity providers if 
they are accepted by the service 
provider 
Mozilla serves as identity 
provider for 
authentication of websites 
Identifiers Personal Unique Identifier 
per user 
Unique handle per user per federated 
pair of website 
Unique identifiers per 
participating website 
Responsible 
controller 
Microsoft and service 
providers were single data 
controllers 
Service providers within a circle of 
trust are controllers at the time users 
visit their websites 
Mozilla and service 
providers as single data 
controllers 
Contractual 
Framework 
Contract between 
Microsoft and service 
provider 
Implementation dependant 
-Contract between every website in a 
circle of trust 
-Depending on implementation other 
models may exist, such as every 
participating service provider having 
a contract with one party which 
organises and administrates the 
circle of trust 
No contract required, 
makes use of open source 
community 
Table 4.1 – Comparison of .NET Passport, Liberty Alliance and Mozilla TrustBar 
Table 4.1 attempts to compartmentalise the three models into specific sections for 
comparison.  The .NET Passport is implanted as a single entity which is maintained and 
managed by Microsoft.  All usage of the .NET Passport requires adherence to Microsoft 
standards by website vendors as stipulated within contracts between Microsoft and these 
parties.  The Liberty Alliance makes use of a set of open specifications that can be 
implemented by parties in various ways to allow for an SSO environment to be created for 
users.  The SSO facility will however only apply between websites within the same circle of 
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trust between the vendors, and should a user move out of this circle they will need to 
resubmit their login criteria.  The responsibility for the validity of the user at time of SSO is 
placed under the controller of the website.  The TrustBar system is very different, looking at 
user issues from the perspective of the user.  TrustBar currently works off a single system 
which is implemented by Mozilla, handling the classification and analysing the security 
quality of the websites to create a central repository for determining website validity.  
TrustBar relies on the open source community for its survival.  It provides an easy to use 
system for the authentication of websites for the user. 
 
Overall the three models analysed provide a significant step towards meeting the overall goal 
of an integrated system for protection of the user in the online environment when looking at 
each of their components.  The .NET Passport provides a facility for the identification and 
authentication of the user within a secure and reliable environment.  With the immense reach 
of the Microsoft solution, the .NET Passport provides the ability for users to span their SSO 
experience across multiple websites, a feat unable to be achieved with the current setup of the 
Liberty Alliance Framework.  The Liberty Alliance does however provide a far more flexible 
solution to the dominance of Microsoft, allowing a flexible framework of best practices for 
companies to adhere to in order to set up their own. On comparison of the Single Sign-On 
technology, .NET Passport is a single platform, providing a single sign-on facility for 
websites associated with its service.  Depending on the form of implementation of the 
Liberty Alliance frameworks, the setup can support multi-organisations SSO.  The TrustBar 
however is responsible for a single verification of user accessed websites.  To place each 
model into a specific category for the issues they resolve the models can be summarised as 
follows: 
 Microsoft .NET Passport – Provides a solution for a broad scale implementation of 
identification and verification of users within an SSO environment.  It also provides a 
relatively simple integration between vendors, due to a single user identification 
provider. 
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 Liberty Alliance – Provides a more flexible implementation solution for the website 
vendor through the circles of trust, although a limited solution for identification and 
verification of the user within an SSO is provided due to potentially limited sizes of 
the circle of trust.  With each website within the circle of trust providing their own 
login forms for the user, and with a greater level of trust between the websites 
involved, the ability to audit users’ movements within the system is greatly increased. 
 Mozilla TrustBar – Provides a way of identification and verification of the website 
from the user perspective.  Through the implementation of an easy to use 
identification and verification process to immediately alert the user to potential 
threats within the website they are attempting to access, the user is provided with a 
greater sense of security and control. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The underlying question the user of a system will always need to ask is the concept of trust.  
In this chapter three concepts of identity management were investigated.  The first two are 
Microsoft Passport.NET and the Liberty Alliance Federated Identity.  Subtle differences 
arose between the two forms that provide a single sign-on for the user.  Finally, the chapter 
delved into the perspective of identity management from a more external point of view 
through the possibilities available under Mozilla TrustBar.  The overview of these three 
models provide the basis for Chapter 5 in which the user experience is fully analysed and a 
model is drawn up based on the experiences of the models analysed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
A USER CENTRIC ONLINE IDENTITY & AUTHENTICATION 
MANAGEMENT MODEL 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 reviewed three existing identity management systems, which are implemented 
internationally.  The overriding theme of all the model implementations is the ultimate 
protection of the user’s experience.  The .NET Passport and Liberty Alliance framework 
were reviewed to provide an insight as to how a user is identified in a single sign-on 
environment.  A view from the user perspective was then taken by looking at other potential 
benefits that the Mozilla TrustBar possesses over that of a traditional SSO approach.  A 
comparison of the attributes generic to the models was performed to show the strengths and 
weaknesses of the relative models. 
 
Chapter 5 proposes a hybrid model which can be used to provide a less experienced Internet 
user with better protection and security when making use of the online environment.  The 
chapter begins by looking at the pitfalls of the previously discussed models in Chapter 4 and 
the processes required for both user and IT system authentication to occur.  The chapter then 
looks at the authentication of IT systems and users.  Within this process the roles of the user 
for the authentication of the IT system, and the role of the IT system in the authentication of 
the user, are defined.  Having defined the requirements from each of these two processes, a 
hybrid model for the protection of the user is proposed.  Through this model, the 
requirements for an effective hybrid authentication system can be deduced.  These 
requirements can then be put to use to ensure that a naive user is adequately protected from 
the potential threats that dominate the online environment.  The emergent model is then 
discussed.  Finally the model is put into context in the terms of general systems theory. 
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5.2 Inherent Issues from Existing models 
Although all three models discussed in Chapter 4 do provide a valued service, none of the 
three cover the overall experience of the user.  This is due to each model focusing 
exclusively on either the sign-on or website identification issues.  None focus on the broader 
issues of the user and the total protection of the user within the online environment.  The 
overall state that needs to be adhered to for the protection of users in the online environment 
can be summarised as follows: 
 Scam Protection – Users need to be aware of the potential scams that exist in the 
worldwide web.  Education is the best form of prevention from such incidents.  
Included in these forms of attacks are requests via email for client banking 
information and general usernames and passwords (Bradley, 2007). 
 Website Spoofing – Possibilities exist for users to be automatically redirected to, or 
directly logon to websites which appear identical to the expected website.  The only 
notable difference is that of the domain name being slightly different from the 
expected domain.  Such websites will have login credentials shown as expected, but 
will be sending the user login information to a malicious third party.  Users need to 
be aware of fraudulent websites and the potential risks that can occur should their 
information be entered into such websites mistakenly (Herzberg, 2005). 
 Multiple Verification – When making use of multiple website services, each with 
individual login criteria, a facility exists to improve the user experience through the 
use of a single sign-on methodology.  One sign in will reduce the possibility of 
interception of client login criteria, and will promote ease of use online.  Although 
this format promotes significant ease of use for the user, the convenience comes at 
a price.  By removing the need for multiple authentications, should the user’s 
identification information be compromised, the security of the user information on 
a multitude of websites will be jeopardised.  Should each website possess their own 
login criteria and security protocols, the security of the user information overall is 
better protected (Lopez, Oppliger & Pernul, 2004). 
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  Credential Security – The credentials of the user need to be securely stored and 
transmitted when authenticating for single sign-on environments.  Losses of this 
form of information could be devastating to the clients’ online identity, either by 
financial means, or personal status loss. 
Each of the models assessed has attributes that cover these user requirements but overall they 
do not cover the entire online user experience.  As shown in Table 4.1 of Chapter 4, the 
methodologies of each model differ significantly in the way in which they deal with the 
identification and authentication of the user and websites accessed.  By assessing the 
shortfalls of the described models, the required elements for a successful model can be 
deduced.  
5.2.1 Liberty Alliance Federated Identity 
The Liberty Alliance Federated Identity Framework provides a setup for a strategic 
partnership amongst individual businesses.  The overall process of user single sign-on is 
secure to the user.  The inherent problem within the Federated Identity proposal is the size of 
the domain.  Domains are set up by like-minded websites who choose to be within the same 
domain.  The potential is still great for the user to have to endure having multiple user 
profiles across multiple domains that may or may not be federated into one identity domain 
or circle of trust. 
 
The concept of a circle of trust (CoT) refers to the business, legal and privacy considerations 
that govern federated identity management between organisations.  Through the use of a CoT 
within the network of companies wishing to form such a partnership, the standards for 
interoperability are defined.  By making use of the Liberty Alliance Frameworks, the 
standards for communication and security in the transmission, identification and 
authentication of user details is defined to promote ease of interoperability amongst all 
participants within the CoT (Liberty Alliance, 2007). 
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The use of the Liberty Alliance Federated Identity Framework has two major disadvantages.  
First is the use of the CoT principles inherent in the framework.  The framework calls for the 
use of protocols and controls between all parties within the CoT.  The setup of all companies 
is different, thereby making the change of company protocols to the Liberty standard an 
expensive and time consuming process.  Furthermore, the scope of the single sign-on of a 
user is limited to only the websites that are engaged in the CoT relationship.  Therefore, even 
with a CoT firmly in place, there is no assurance that the user will make use of the SSO 
opportunities, as they may never interact with another website within that particular circle. 
 
Secondly, should the user make use of the SSO facility within websites of the CoT, the user 
is then risking their personal information via a lack of “defence in depth”.  The “defence in 
depth” concept is an information assurance strategy on which multiple layers of defence are 
placed within an IT system.  The principle behind the “defence in depth” approach is 
ensuring that any potential attacker must compromise multiple defensive procedures, in order 
to successfully gain access to the system (IATF, 2002).  By providing a single criterion for 
identification of a user, the multiple levels of security for the identification and authentication 
of a user per website are removed.  Through this process, the user is then exposed to potential 
risks, in which once their login credentials are compromised, and an attacker can gain access 
to user information stored on all other partner websites in the CoT. 
 
The Liberty Alliance framework can be a very successful and viable solution to provide a 
client with a seamless online experience should a global implementation of trust and an 
overall domain of trust prevail. 
5.2.2 .NET Passport 
Microsoft’s .NET Passport implementation provides a global potential solution to the single 
sign-on identity problem.  From a user perspective Microsoft is viewed as the industry leader.  
Over the years Microsoft has cemented its dominance over the computer industry with its 
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operating systems.  This overall dominance instils a form of user recognition and reliance.  
Microsoft also possesses the capability of setting up the massive infrastructure required to 
undertake a global identity domain. 
 
The .NET Passport has some major disadvantages.  Similarly to the Liberty Alliance 
Federated Identity Framework, it also suffers from a lack of “defence in depth”.  Users need 
only sign in once to gain access to all websites making use of the .NET Passport SSO 
methodology.  This will similarly expose the user to potential risks.  If their .NET login 
credentials are compromised, an attacker can gain access to all websites that are affiliated 
with the .NET Passport program.  Secondly, users should be made more aware of the perils 
of making use of the automatic sign in to .NET Passport.  Use of this facility should be 
removed as cookies are permanently activated and the user is never signed out of the system.  
This can lead to potential security breaches under the user’s identity.  Along with these 
problems within the .NET Passport framework is the problem of a developing monopoly 
situation.  Having a single company, such as Microsoft, dictating terms on how technologies 
should be implemented, can become problematic within the industry, as consensus will not 
necessarily be followed in the setting up of the best practices for SSO environments.  
Furthermore, with one company maintaining full control of user information, the civil 
liberties of the service users could be compromised should the company be forced to disclose 
this information to government.  
5.2.3 Mozilla TrustBar 
The Mozilla TrustBar implementation provides a unique view, focusing on the protection of 
the user.  Implementations of identity management solutions primarily focus on the 
protection of the client data within the process of identity authentication.  TrustBar takes a 
wider view of the identification issue, and promotes a format through which a user can 
themselves ensure they connect to the website that they intended to.  By giving the user the 
ability to verify the website they are attempting to access, the user plays an active role in the 
security process and their actions determine the course of action on the website.  It ensures 
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that the user is not potentially exposing their login credentials via a spoofed website.  The 
disadvantage of the TrustBar is the displaying of the verification information for the website 
that the user is accessing.  A naïve user may simply choose to ignore the warnings that are 
presented to them.  What is ultimately needed is more user interaction in determining that 
they are in the correct domain. 
 
The major disadvantage of the Mozilla TrustBar framework is the lack of provision of an 
overall solution for the protection of the user.  The TrustBar is simply an add-on to a browser 
and does not provide any facilities for SSO opportunities for users.  For this solution only 
protects the user from spoofed and less secure versions of the intended website, and plays no 
role in the protection of user credentials within an SSO online implementation. 
 
In order to adequately develop a model to ensure the users’ protection, an understanding of 
the attributes required for authentication of a person by an information technology system, 
and the requirements for a user to authenticate a system, need to be identified. 
 
5.3 Authentication of IT Systems and Users 
A principal cause in the increase in identity related crimes in the online world is due to 
authentication procedures in the online world being far less secure than those in the offline 
world.  A bank may have thick walls, security guards, and a secure vault to protect the 
customer investments, for example.  This proposes a significant obstacle to any criminal 
wishing to break in.  Within the online environment the point of entry can be as simple as a 
username and password.  Through the use of a brute force attack and the computing power of 
modern day computers, the security controls can be compromised.  The process of social 
engineering to acquire client information can make an attempt to access client information 
even simpler.  Through the process of making a system online from its offline predecessor, 
the technical authentication procedures are adapted to the online capabilities, frequently 
without adapting the security measures (FIDIS, 2006).  The offline procedure allows for 
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security checks to take place far easier than the online procedure that it replaces.  The 
authentication of the actual website may be adequate, but if users are incapable of 
establishing the trustworthiness of the website they are lured to, this does not help. 
 
The traditional movement of existing company security infrastructures to the online 
equivalent can be a complex task.  This is due to controls existing in the real world, such as 
high walls or fences, not necessarily having an equivalent in the online environment.  By 
making use of more controls and checks and by having dual authentication performed by 
both users and systems, a more secure environment for the online user will be developed. 
5.3.1 Authentication of users by IT Systems 
The process of user authentication is principally linked to the verification of the user identity 
in order to control user access to restricted resources and areas.  Authentication is based on 
something an individual possesses, such as an identity card or passport, something an 
individual knows, such as a password or PIN, or something an individual is, being their 
human characteristics.  The core advantages of using the processes of possession and user 
knowledge are the ease through which such systems can be configured and set up, the low 
cost involved in the implementation, and the ease of use of the system for the user.  However 
the inherent problem in these two authentication forms is the ease with which passwords or 
smartcards can be shared or lost, thereby compromising the user security.  From a technical 
viewpoint, an identity is nothing more than a digital pseudonym that represents a person.  
Because of this, measures are needed to prove that the digital pseudonym belongs to the 
person who claims it as their own. (FIDIS, 2006) 
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Figure 5.1 - Authentication by an IT System (FIDIS, 2006) 
Figure 5.1 depicts how an IT system can determine the authenticity of an individual.  When 
an identity is used, it must always be in connection with proof that it was used by the person 
to whom it belongs.  This process is known as dual authentication which is stronger than a 
single form of authentication.  This is due to the increase in criteria that is required in order 
to identify the user.  By increasing the number of unique identifiers required to be met by the 
user, the “defence in depth” strategy applies by providing more comprehensive protection of 
the user identity.  Based on these, IT systems are able to recognise a human by: 
• what he is through the use of biometric techniques  
• what he possesses 
• what he knows 
The more controls that can be implemented via the use of identification criteria in an 
authentication process cause an increase in the level of certainty that the authorised identity is 
accessing the system.  Through this process of making use of more criteria for the 
authentication process, higher levels of trust by both the user and the system are created.  
This translates to a strong security environment existing within the system. 
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5.3.2 Authentication of an IT System by a Person 
Thefts of user identification information, such as usernames and passwords, are performed by 
deceiving a user into believing that an IT system is what it claims to be.  Via this spoofed 
website, the user enters their login information and attempts to connect, inadvertently 
sending their identity data to the hoax website perpetrator.  A user authenticates an IT system 
through three points as shown in figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2 - Authentication of an IT System by a Human (FIDIS, 2006) 
These points as described by the Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) are: 
 What the IT system is – By looking at the information coming through on the 
displayed website, the user can determine the validity of the visited website.  The 
immediate method of identifying a website is through the assessing of the website’s 
URL.  If the URL corresponds to the website the users expected, they continue the 
assessment by determining the validity of the website’s digital certificates.  In 
checking the digital certificates the user can determine the validity of the website 
through the scrutiny of the digital certificate, particularly looking into the issuer of 
the digital certificate and the dates for which the certificate is valid.  This process 
can be automated through the use of a system such as Mozilla TrustBar. 
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 What the IT system knows – Through the registration process the user will setup 
their initial profile consisting of a username and password.  Additional to this 
process, some websites may make requests for other personal information relating 
to the client, such as a mother’s maiden name.  Through display of this information 
through user interaction, the user is ensured they are on the correct website. 
 
Through the use of both user authentication and system authentication, a user can ensure they 
are making use of a valid Internet website.  Thereby a generic model for the promotion of an 
overall solution to the problem of encompassing the entire user experience is required to 
adequately protect the user from the possible threats of online identity theft. 
5.4 A Model for Securing the User Online experience 
In order to protect the user from the number of threats to their online identity, an approach is 
needed in which both the authentication of the user criteria and the authentication of the 
website visited online are made possible.  In Figure 5.3 a model is proposed which promotes 
a dual pronged approach to the protection of user information within the online environment.  
This model addresses user protection from two angles.  Firstly the validity of the website is 
checked and reported back to the user.  This is done to ensure that the user is attempting to 
access and authenticate on the correct version of the website.  After this process, the process 
of SSO authentication takes place to allow the user to make use of the benefits within the 
SSO environment. 
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Figure 5.3 – Model for User Centric Online Protection 
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2. Site Identification 
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5.4.1 Description of Model 
The process described in the model is expanded as follows: 
1.  User Requests Website – The user makes use of their browser and enters the URL of the 
website they intend to visit.  From selection of this website the process then moves into the 
process responsible for the authentication of the website. 
2.  Website Identification Request – On the user performing a request of the intended 
website, a request is sent to a central repository for the validation of websites, such as the 
repository used by Mozilla TrustBar.  The information in this repository will provide 
information to the user in order for them to validate the security of the website. 
2.1 Check Website URL – With the information stored in the repository, a number of checks 
take place in order to determine the security built within the requested website. 
2.1.1  Determine Most Secure Website - A number of websites potentially have more secure 
web pages, which are not necessarily set as the default login page.  In these cases the 
repository will determine which website is the most secure.  If a more secure inner link for 
the same domain is found, the repository sends back a response to the user browser in order 
to redirect to the more secure website.  Should this occur, then the entire process begins 
again. 
2.1.2 Website Security Check – This process involves checking the requested URL.  Based 
on the URL the repository then searches in order to determine the validity of the digital 
certificates, the authority of the certificate issuers, for example Verisign, and also if the 
website is flagged as a spoofed website.  The result of this is a URL validation report, which 
is then sent back to the user browser, in order to display the results and allow the user the 
opportunity to validate the website themselves, from these results. 
3.  Website Retrieval Request Sent – When the user requests the website, the physical request 
to retrieve the website is sent and the website is retrieved as per normal HTTP protocols. 
4.  User Login – Once the page has been loaded with the information required for the 
validation report, the user then attempts to login to the single sign-on website.  In this process 
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to promote more secure sign-on a biometric form of input, such as user fingerprint 
identification, is sent along with the traditional password identification.  Should either of 
these validation properties fail to achieve a positive identification, the user is sent back to the 
initial login page.  Should both criteria match, the user is then verified and authenticated 
within the single sign-on environment.  This process will then ultimately lead to secure user 
identification. 
5.4.2 Relation of proposed model to General Systems Theory 
The concept of General Systems Theory proposes that systems work individually within their 
own environments and achieve their sub-goals.  When the overall system is analysed and 
each subsystem is assessed as part of the whole environment, an emerging property becomes 
evident, through which each sub-system adds a benefit which contributes to the overall 
functioning of the whole system (Heylighen & Joslyn, 1992). 
 
When a user makes a website request, there is uncertainty on the part of the user, on the 
security of the environment through which the user is attempting to access.  This process 
involves a large level of trust on the part of the user, that their information is not being 
intercepted by a third party.  By creating a dual pronged approach to protect the user, a 
secure environment is created in which the user can have confidence in their online 
environment’s security. 
 
The process of identification and validation of a website which a user is attempting to access 
provides an intermediate step in the overall protection of the user.  With the implementation 
of controls with the user in the form of visual markers to easily identify the website they are 
attempting to connect to, the user plays an active role in their own protection.  This website 
identification and authentication process for the user can be kept as an individual subsystem, 
and work individually just within this role.  As a single component of the system however it 
does not provide the full functionality to protect the user from all potential online threats. 
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In the process of user identification and authentication at time of sign-in, the verification 
process of the user is built upon by the dual forms of authentication of both biometric and 
password verification.  Each of these processes can be seen as subsystems in the overall 
protection of the user.  The authentication of the user by means of the username and 
password validation would run as a separate process to that of the biometric authentication.  
All subsystems work together to provide an improved level of authentication for the user.  By 
making use of a dual authentication process for the process of identifying and authenticating 
the user, the website then has a higher level of certainty that the user is who he or she claims 
to be. 
 
Based on the above mentioned subsystems, similar parallels can be seen between the 
proposed model and general systems theory.  The identification of the user is broken down 
into two parts.  The first is responsible for the validation of the user through the traditional 
means of username and password.  The second is responsible for the validation of the user 
through biometric forms of identification.  Each of these processes or subsystems is 
responsible for a portion of the whole solution.  Without both processes the identification and 
authentication of the user will be flawed, as each system individually will not adequately 
identify the user.  Similar to this is the incorporation of the system authentication by the user.  
With only user identification the website could be fraudulent, and without the user 
identification, the user could not be identified.  By making use of each of the smaller 
processes for authentication the check within both the website authentication process, and the 
user verification process, each process builds on to the other and creates an emergent 
property which can be defined as a system for the greater protection of a user within the 
online environment.  
5.4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an insight into the requirements to protect a user from the threats 
within an online environment.  Through the use of a username, password and biometric 
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forms of identification, the accuracy of user identification is increased.  In addition to this the 
ability for the user to identify the website attempting to be accessed, and verify its 
authenticity, protects the user from potential online threats such as spoofing.  By the 
combination of these to forms of authentication, from the user and from the system side, an 
enhanced level of security is created for the user.  This protects the user from potential 
threats from website spoofing and identity theft.  Through the use of a dual pronged approach 
to user and system authentication, a higher level of trust is produced between the two parties. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary of Chapters 
The adoption of the Internet and the numerous opportunities available within it has made an 
indelible impact upon modern society; unfortunately with its adoption within the mainstream 
population cyber crime has increased.  The reason for this is the major difference between the 
real world and the online environment.  In the real world trust between the customer and the 
business retailer is gained far more easily.  The real world has tangible attributes, such as 
guards and locked doors which the user can immediately recognise and builds a sense of 
trust.  In the online environment the propagation of trust between user and website is far 
more difficult to establish.  In addition to this issue is the increase in the number of new users 
to the online marketplace.  With these new users there are high levels of susceptibility for 
naïve users being targeted through social engineering techniques to retrieve their user 
credentials.  It is important for users to have their information adequately protected through 
all stages of their online experience, in order to shield users from such threats. 
 
Chapter 1 provides a background to the problems faced by users in the online environment.  
The research area and the research problem were introduced to provide the processes that 
should be adhered to by client users and websites to ensure that a user’s identity information 
is adequately protected online.  The intended objectives, and research methodology to be 
used, were presented.  Chapter 1 concludes with a high level overview of the research 
project. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the identity management process.  By showing the laws 
stipulated by governments for the protection of an individual’s online identity, the emphasis 
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placed on the protection of user information is shown.  The types of identity that exist, and 
the attributes associated with them are presented, along with the generic process for the 
identity management life cycle to provide a background to the topic and the processes that 
should be performed for effective management of an identity.  The aims for identity 
management within the public and private domain are presented, to define what is expected 
by both domains for the management of an identity.  The concepts underlying an identity 
management framework are presented in order to show the process for the implementation of 
an identity management solution in an organisation, and the benefits of such a process.  
Finally an enquiry is made into the setting up of standards initiatives for the management of 
identities, and how they came to exist. 
 
Chapter 3 performs an investigation into the access and authentication management process.  
With the significant difference between the environments of the real world and that of the 
online environment the management of user levels of trust within the systems is an important 
issue to consider.  Statistics are presented relating to the usage of online systems and effect a 
lack of trust can have on a business.  Based on this premise, the role of access control is 
presented.  Within access control the accountability aspects are discussed to show the 
benefits of access control logging.  Techniques for access control are mentioned to give 
insight into how website should be managed.  The life cycle of access rights are presented 
and provides an insight into trends of how user access rights tend to increase regardless of 
their system roles, until they are removed.  This is in contrast of the best practice of access 
control and assigning only the necessary access rights to users to perform their function.  The 
chapter concludes with an investigation into the role of access management in terms of the 
compliance within the best practices of corporate governance in ITIL and COBIT. 
 
Chapter 4 performs a comparison of three existing implementations of identity management 
solutions.  An analysis of the Microsoft .NET Passport solution for SSO of users is presented, 
by first looking at the common user identity model, to provide an overview of the identity 
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model verification process common across all forms of identity models implemented in the 
three selected models.  The .NET Passport model is analysed paying particular attention to 
the SSO Identity domain model.  The processes are analysed with a focus placed on the 
registration and authentication process for users within an SSO environment.  The Liberty 
Alliance’s Federated User Identity framework is assessed to give a different perspective to 
the SSO solution supplied by Microsoft.  The federated user identity is proposed by a number 
of companies to promote interoperability within setup circles of trust between businesses for 
the purposes of SSO.  The Mozilla TrustBar is analysed to look at the identification and 
verification from the perspective of the user.  Finally a comparison of the models takes place 
through the use of a table to easily show the core differences between the three models. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a proposal for the implementation of a dual pronged approach to the 
identification and authentication of both users and websites.  By making use of a dual 
authentication approach to ensure that both the website and the user are valid, a higher level 
of protection to the user’s identity is achieved.  The chapter begins by looking into the issues 
affecting the existing three models for identity management, and the expectations of the user 
for an overall solution for protection from online threats.  The process for the authentication 
of users by IT systems, and the authentication of IT systems by users is presented in order to 
determine the requirements for performing a dual form of authentication within a single 
system for authentication and SSO.  The model for a dual pronged approach to the 
identification and authentication of both user and website is presented and described.  The 
model is then described in terms of its contribution to general systems theory. 
6.2 Solving the Research Problems 
The main research problem set out in Chapter 1 was, “What processes must be adhered to 
by the client user and the website, to ensure the protection of the user’s identity in the 
online environment?”  In order to effectively answer these questions, a set of sub-problems 
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were defined, that needed to be answered in order to solve the overall problem.  These sub-
problems were: 
• What are the critical success factors for identification and authentication of a 
user at time of sign-on? 
Chapter 2 discussed the laws and regulations stipulated by governments for the 
protection of an individual’s online identity.  Based on these laws the standards for 
identification and authentication for the protection of user information is defined 
through the use of COBIT and ITIL.  Further in Chapter 2, the aims for identity 
management within the public and private domain were discussed, in order to 
determine the requirements that would best suit both domains to manage an identity.  
Core to the process of identification and authentication is the guarantee that the 
expected user is connecting to the system.  By making use of the traditional username 
and password criteria, and a biometric identifier in order to validate the user, the 
certainty level in the user validation is that much greater.  The concept of an identity 
management framework was presented in Chapter 2 to determine the best process for 
the implementation of an identity management solution within an organisation, and 
the resulting benefits to making use of such a process.  Chapter 3 provided some 
further background on the importance of levels of trust for users’ and businesses 
mutual benefit.  The importance of access control was discussed to provide insight 
into the techniques used to successfully control user access, and effectively protect 
their system from threats by making use of concepts such as the life cycle of access 
rights for users.  The concept of SSO was presented throughout the research project, 
and the requirements for user reconnection to the SSO environment were mentioned 
in Chapter 4.  In adhering to practices of securing the user login area and the controls 
in monitoring this area for potential threats, increasing the user identification criteria 
by insisting on alternate biometric forms of identifiers, the owner of the website is 
ensured of a higher level of confidence that the expected user is connected to the 
system. 
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Based on the findings from this sub-problem, the following processes should be in place to 
solve the overall research problem: 
 
 Users need to be identified and authenticated within an environment that is as 
secure as possible, making use of the strongest forms of security protocols available 
on the Internet. 
 Users need to be identified through the use of as many identifiers as possible.  By 
making use of a username, password, and form of biometric authentication, the 
chance that the incorrect user is attempting to access the website is greatly reduced. 
Therefore, this sub-problem has been met by determining the critical success factors for user 
identification and authentication are a secure sign-on environment and an increased number 
of user credentials. 
 
• Second sub-problem: What process can be used to ensure a user is connecting to 
an authentic website? 
 
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of three common identity management models.  The 
Mozilla TrustBar was analysed to provide an insight into how a user can be involved 
and provide their own website authentication.  By providing the users with a process 
for adequate and easy to use identification of the website based on website 
authentication criteria, the user plays an active role in the determination of the 
validity of the website.  By making use of a facility similar to the Mozilla TrustBar a 
simple process of identification and validation of the website and the security criteria 
built within the website is provided.  Through the introduction of a centralised 
repository for listing the security of websites and the most secure website within a 
specified URL to reroute users away from possible security threats within a website, 
extra value is added to this process.  
 
  84 
Based on the findings from this sub-problem, the following process should be in place to 
solve the overall research problem: 
 
 The security criteria of a website, and its validity should be presented to the user in 
an easy to understand format, for the user to immediately identify any potential 
risks to their online identity by signing in to a potentially compromised website.  
Through this the user plays an active role in the identification and authentication 
process. 
Thus, this research project has adequately addressed this sub-problem by identifying the need 
for user involvement in the process of validating the website they are attempting to access.  
This sub-problem helped contribute by showing the benefits of having user involvement in 
the authentication process. 
 
• Third sub-problem: How can users be adequately protected from common online 
threats? 
In the analysis of the three identity models set out in Chapter 4, the processes 
involved in the use of an SSO environment were discussed in the use of Microsoft’s 
.NET Passport and the Liberty Alliances Federated Identity.  By making use of 
similar technology for the identification and authentication of users during the sign-
on process, but making use of a further biometric component, the user’s information 
is made more secure.  Further controls that should be considered are the locking of 
user accounts when the identification criteria are not met, and possible use of login 
timers to ensure that users reconnect when they have been inactive for a prolonged 
period of time.  Chapter 5 proposes a model which makes use of a dual pronged 
approach for the authentication and identification of both the user and the website.  
This model is based on the best practices defined from the industry leaders in SSO 
(Liberty Alliance and Microsoft) and the expectations of the user for an overall 
solution for protecting themselves from online threats.  The model proposes a 
solution which handles both forms of identification.  Through this process the website 
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is identified and authenticated by the user’s browser, and the user goes through a 
process of identification and authentication during the process of sign-in to the 
website.  By making use of such a system with two forms of authentication to protect 
both the user and the website, cases of potential fraud situations and identity theft are 
avoided.  Through such a solution which handles both these authentications in a 
simple to identify and easy to use framework, the security of the naïve user is 
ensured. 
 
Based on the findings from this sub-problem, the following process should be in place to 
solve the overall research problem: 
 
 Login counters should be implemented to lock users out of their accounts should 
they fail to authenticate within a designated number of attempts. 
 Login timers should be implemented to ensure the user has not been compromised 
through the interception of their session information.  If the user’s session becomes 
inactive for a prolonged period of time, the user must be forced to sign back into 
the SSO. 
 Users and websites should play an active role in performing a process of dual 
authentication, each by the other party, to ensure that a greater level of trust is built 
between them. 
The processes for controlling the identification and authentication of both the user and the 
website need to be enforced to create a secure online environment. 
 
Hence this sub-problem has been addressed by providing suggestions to protect the user from 
potential online threats.  Together the three sub-problems have addressed the research 
problem as stated in the problem statement. 
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6.3 Future Research 
As a continuation of the research presented within this research project, empirical data should 
be collected to determine the specific requirements of both Internet users and the websites 
wishing to incorporate SSO methodologies within their customer service, what they consider 
acceptable levels of performance and the priority they attached to this type of initiative.  An 
analysis of the user study, including a background of users and will ensure that the needs of 
all users and service providers are considered in the scoping and development of the system 
and will ensure that the focus of the system remains true. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide a number of issues for potential further research which fall outside 
the scope of this project.  The privacy rights of the users in making use of a system which 
will be responsible for the protection of their online identity information and having their 
online history of websites visited being recorded, can be researched.  Should this information 
fall into criminal hands or be requested by a government, the privacy rights of the individual 
will be compromised.  A further avenue of research is the cost implications and how such a 
system will be adequately governed.  The setting up of an organisation tasked with validating 
users and websites will need to be investigated to determine which organisation will be best 
suited to handle this information, and the challenges surrounding securing the information on 
such a critical system for user protection.  Further research is also required in the determining 
of how the proposed model could be best implemented to provide an easy to use solution for 
the protection of the user and the website from user fraud and identity theft.  These areas 
need to be researched in depth to ensure the release of such a system is viable within the 
current Internet market. 
6.4 Summary 
A comprehensive framework for the protection of the user within the online environment 
does not yet exist.  This may well be due to the chaotic nature of the Internet, through which 
each website and user browser would need to require a unique blend of technologies in order 
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to make such a solution work.  However, this research project contributed by providing a 
model for the integration of user and website validation procedures along with sign-on 
processes into one combined process.  The next step in this research area could be the 
conducting of further research into how the model proposed within Chapter 5 can be 
implemented to provide an easy to use solution for the protection of users. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem today is that users are expected to remember multiple user names and passwords for 
different domains when accessing the Internet.  Identity management solutions seek to solve this 
problem through creating a digital identity that is exchangeable across organisational boundaries.  
This is done through the setup of collaboration agreements between multiple domains, thus users can 
easily switch across domains without being required to repeatedly sign-on.  However, this technology 
is accompanied by the threat of user identity and personal information being ‘stolen’.  Criminals 
make use of fake or ‘spoofed’ websites and social engineering techniques to gain illegal access to this 
information on the user.  This has been catapulted to the fore by the statement that phishing has 
increased by 8000% over the period of January 2005 to September 2006 (APACS, 2007).  Due to 
this, the need for users to be protected from online threats has drastically increased.  This paper 
examines two processes in order to protect the user login information.  Firstly, user’s information 
must be protected at the time of sign-on, and secondly, a simple method for the identification of the 
website is required by the user.  This paper looks at these processes of identifying and verifying user 
information followed by how the user can verify the website at sign-on.  The roles of identity and 
access management are defined within the context of single sign-on.  Three different models for 
identity management are analysed, namely the Microsoft .NET Passport, Liberty Alliance Federated 
Identity for Single Sign-on and the Mozilla TrustBar for website authentication.  A new model for the 
definitive protection of the user in the online environment is proposed based on the evaluation of 
these three existing models. 
 
KEY WORDS 
Identity Management, Authentication Management, Mozilla TrustBar, Liberty Alliance, .NET 
Passport 
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A USER CENTRIC MODEL FOR ONLINE IDENTITY AND 
ACCESS MANAGEMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has played a major role in the way people do business and interact 
socially.  Websites are used to sell goods and provide services online whilst storing sensitive 
customer information such as credit card details and identity numbers.  This information is 
stored using simplistic user sign-on tools.  The use of this technology creates the challenge of 
how to ensure that the correct user is connecting to the correct system online. 
To ensure users are who they claim to be at the time of sign-on an authentication tool, 
other than that of single key authentication password, is required.  The use of dual key 
authentication, over that of single key passwords, produces higher levels of trust between the 
user and website provider.  A number of users are still naïve as to the dangers of the Internet 
and are connecting to websites with simple security measures for client authentication.  The 
authentication process may occur on fraudulently set up spoofed websites.  This exposes the 
user to the risk of potential identity theft.  Although organisations have been set up to 
standardise the processes of online identity management, the risk exists that a user’s account 
information can be illegally accessed.  It is therefore important that adequate identity 
management controls are put into place to secure the online user. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 presents the role of 
identity management for businesses as a tool to meet legal requirements for client protection 
and the benefits of identity management to the business.  Section 3 investigates the role of 
access and authentication management, focusing on user issues and trends relating to online 
systems usage.  Section 4 provides an overview of the identity management solutions 
implemented by Microsoft Passport .NET, Liberty Alliance Federated User Identity and the 
Mozilla TrustBar.  Section 5 provides a critical comparison of the models.  The discovery is 
made that none of the investigated models focus on the issues of the user and the protection 
of the user within the online environment.  Each model focuses exclusively on the sign-on or 
website identification processes and lacks a wholesome environment for the user to interact 
within.  Section 6 attempts to create a model for user centric online protection.  This model is 
based on the use of dual authentication techniques in the form of user authentication by the 
system, and system authentication by the user. 
2 ROLE OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
Through the use of identity management, businesses benefit as they draw from best 
practices and ensure compliance to regulations.  Legal requirements for client protection are 
implemented to provide a code of “best practice” as noted in COBIT and ITIL (Lewis, 2003).  
The company is ultimately responsible for the use of identity information and is held 
accountable should that information be used fraudulently.  In making use of the identity 
management life-cycle the user’s account is managed from the time of creation, to the time of 
the user permanently leaves the system.  This process includes the removal and addition of 
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system rights (De Leeuw, 2004).  Through efficient use of an identity management solution 
companies realise the following benefits: 
1. Better planning, implementation and management of solutions through a 
complete user based life-cycle of services. 
2. Reduction in costs and complexity, while increasing the rate of return on 
investment made in Identity management. 
3. Predictable implementation procedures and efficient business operations, 
thereby ensuring greater system satisfaction for both users and customers. 
4. Manages all four main areas of concern for the business (people, process, practice 
and platform), when implementing identity management in the organisation (Sun 
Microsystems, n.d.) (Gordon, 2004) 
Organisations now view identity management solutions as the answer to a number of 
security challenges.  It is also imperative for organisations to consider how they can take full 
advantage of the benefits and the value of an identity management system within their 
business (BMC Software, 2006).  Furthermore, the use of effective identity management 
controls will provide the system user with a secure environment within which they can 
function.  The effectiveness of such a process, however, is only as strong as the level to 
which access and authentication management controls are applied. 
3 ACCESS AND AUTHENTICATION MANAGEMENT 
To manage a business environment in which multiple users require access to systems 
over large and distributed networks, it is essential that the business ensures the users 
connecting to this environment are whom they claim to be.  The Internet has the ability to 
mask an identity, and this process can be used to perpetrate fraud.  Due to this ability, every 
action performed online is subject to a degree of risk.  This lack of trust has spread into the 
banking sector.  In a recent report by the journal, Computer Fraud and Security it was stated 
that 52% of respondents were unlikely to sign up to online banking facilities and that 82% of 
respondents would not respond to any emails from financial firms (Consumers losing trust in 
online banking: survey, 2007).   
In online commerce customers take on substantial levels of risk when making 
purchases from an online vendor.  This is because all encounters take place through the 
vendor website.  This has created the need for customers to be able to assess the risk when 
purchasing online.   
Customers often leave a website when they do not gain a sufficient sense of trust 
(Chau, Hu, Lee & Au, 2006).  Due to online merchants storing large amounts of customer 
data it is critical for vendors to build strong trusting relationships with their customers.  This 
can be ensured by making use of proper access control procedures to provide minimal risk to 
the customer.  From the perspective of the merchant, there is little concern over the identity 
of the individual customer, but more concern over their ability to pay for services or goods.  
If security is breached on the vendor website, it is imperative that accurate logs exist for the 
auditing of user actions. 
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The dangers to users in the online environment are summarised as spoofing, phishing 
and identity theft.   By implementing strong controls to ensure that an authorised user is 
accessing the system, the business risk is diminished (Rodger, 2004).  In order to identify the 
best methods to protect an online identity from online threats, it is essential to look at 
international systems for single sign-on (SSO) protection of the user.   
4 COMPARISON OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 
The ideal environment for the computer scientist is one in which computer systems 
know who their users are.  The ideology behind this is based on the concept that users should 
be authenticated as simply as possible.   An investigation is performed in order to determine 
the approaches to implement this idea, specifically looking at Microsoft’s Passport .NET, 
Liberty Alliance and Mozilla TrustBar.  
4.1 Microsoft Passport .NET  
The Passport .NET service makes use of a SSO Identity Domain.  Microsoft is suited 
for the process of handling an SSO platform as it already provides a large variety of services 
online for e-mail, online messaging and search facilities.  Issues regarding user privacy and 
freedom of movement online could be infringed should a single entity take control of all SSO 
authentications and the information held therein.  The process followed for user 
authentication through the Passport service is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – The Passport Authentication Process (Microsoft, 2004) 
1. User browses to participating site or service (Site A in this example) and clicks “Sign In” 
button or link 
2. User is redirected to Passport 
3. Passport checks if the user has a “Ticket Granting Cookie” (TGC) in their browser’s 
cookie file meeting the rules of Site A.  If one is detected, they skip to step 4 and do 
not go through the login process.  If the TGC has lapsed based on Site A’s time 
requirements, then the user is redirected to a page asking for their login credentials to 
be entered correctly in order to proceed 
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4. The user is redirected back to Site A with their encrypted authentication ticket and 
profile information attached. 
5. Site A decrypts the authentication ticket and profile information and signs the 
customer into the website. 
6. The user accesses the page, resource or service they requested from Site A. 
NOTE: No information about a user is shared with Sites B and C unless the user 
chooses to sign-on to those sites. 
A potentially hazardous feature to the user of .NET Passport reported by both 
Microsoft (2004) and discussed by Kormann and Rubin (2000) is that of the automatic sign-
on to Passport.  If this option is selected the username and password of the individual user are 
stored locally on the individual client’s machine.  When an automatic sign-on is selected the 
user will be signed on to the .NET Passport service without intervention.  Disconnecting 
from the Internet or turning the machine off has no effect on the connection of the user to the 
service.  This option creates the possibility for a user’s account to be infiltrated potentially 
exposing sensitive information. 
Although a user may use their .NET Passport account at multiple sites, the password is 
only stored in the .NET Passport database and is only shared with the .NET Passport servers 
that need to make use of it for authentication.  The .NET Passport service contains a feature 
in which should the user in making an error in attempting to sign-on, the system 
automatically blocks access to the user account for a few minutes.  This process stops 
attempts using password cracking software to gain unlawful access to the account. 
Overall the .NET Passport solution provides a relatively simple solution to the 
problems experienced by users within SSO.  Websites affiliated with the .NET Passport 
program can opt to have the service manage their user base, shifting the responsibility for this 
process from the individual website on to Microsoft.  As stated previously the main 
drawback to the .NET Passport solution is the problem of having a single entity responsible 
for all identity authentication tasks, as it can be exposed to security and privacy issues. 
4.2 Liberty Alliance Federated User Identity 
The Liberty Alliance is an undertaking by a group of organisations and government 
agencies to provide a set of open technical specifications for the creation of a federated 
identity solution.  When the Liberty Alliance began their operations the first phase of 
development involved the setting up of specifications which enabled simplified SSO for end 
users.  This process became Liberty’s Identity Federation Framework (Madsen, 2004). 
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The Liberty specifications for SSO are an enabler which provides SSO functionality 
across different enterprise domains and websites. 
 
Figure 2 – Browser based SSO (Pfitzmann, 2004) 
Pfitzmann (2004) describes the process of Liberty’s SSO as follows: 
A user is accessing the service provider whilst browsing online.  When submitting a 
sign-on request, the service provider redirects the browser to the user’s identity provider.  
The user then log’s in, through the use of a typical username and password.  The identity 
provider redirects the browser back to the service provider with an additional ticket, to 
handle other services, such as data transfer logistics on other channels 
The benefit of using this form of implementation is that the user does not have to be 
redirected to a separate login page for authentication purposes.  Once the user is 
authenticated by one service within the “circle of trust” all other websites within that trust 
domain can verify the user as having been authenticated, eliminating the need for multiple 
SSO (Liberty Alliance, 2007). 
The Liberty Alliance provides a viable alternative to the solution from the .NET 
Passport.  By having a consortium of companies involved in the setting of standards, a 
broader level of consensus is achieved and the best solution implemented.  Within the realm 
of SSO the problem with Liberty Alliance’s solution is the lack of ability to provide a 
scalable solution for a user to connect to a multitude of websites.  This is due to each setup of 
the federated identity solution existing within separate circles of trust.  If a user moves 
between two different trust circles, they will be required to sign-on with different credentials. 
4.3 Mozilla TrustBar 
A potential solution for a user to identify the websites they are connecting to is the use 
of a plug-in toolbar supplied within Mozilla Firefox browsers.  Through the use of this plug-
in a user can store images mapped to server certificates.  Whenever a server certificate is 
verified, the mapped image is displayed on the toolbar, while the corresponding page is still 
being loaded (Jøsang & Pope, 2005).  Mozilla TrustBar focuses on how to secure the user in 
the authentication of websites.  Through the use of this, the user is protected from the threats 
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of phishing and website spoofing.  The TrustBar attempts to make users more aware of the 
security behind the web pages they view. 
The overall process of the client user authentication on the server attempts to protect 
against potential eavesdropping and modification by Man in the Middle (MITM) adversaries.  
Large numbers of financial and other websites make use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) to 
authenticate the user.  A number of those sites however only make use of SSL protocols once 
the user has typed in a username and password and clicked ‘submit’ (Herzberg, 2005). 
This form of implementation provides the potential for a MITM to redirect the user 
towards a modified version of the web page.  Should this occur the user may unknowingly 
provide login information to a third party.  Through the modified page, if the user attempts to 
login, the user information is sent back to the MITM.  Clearly the traditional approach of 
signing on does not protect the user from these forms of attack, and the user requires an 
easier way to verify that he or she is on the intended website. 
Herzberg (2005) mentions the ways in which TrustBar provides a solution to the client 
user problem as follows: 
• TrustBar periodically downloads a list of the unprotected websites that are 
maintained on the Mozilla TrustBar servers.  This list stores the unprotected 
login sites which Mozilla tracks, as well as any alternate login pages for those 
websites that are protected.  This information can be used to redirect the client 
if an unsafe link is found. 
• TrustBar makes allowance for users to assign a logo to websites of their own 
choosing to visually identify the website.  TrustBar tracks changes to websites 
and displays information in the form of a “Same since” and a date value.  After 
the website changes a warning is displayed when the page is accessed. 
Herzberg and Gbara (2007) provide further uses of TrustBar for solving the user 
problem in the following situations: 
• In SSL websites, TrustBar shows, by default, the name of the organisation that 
owns the website through the identification of the digital certificate.  TrustBar 
also displays a representation of the logo or the name of the certification 
authority which issued the certificate. 
• TrustBar displays a padlock for all protected websites, and a “No Entry” signs 
for unprotected websites. 
The Mozilla TrustBar’s solution to the user’s web usage condition is novel.  The 
service provides the client with a free-to-use facility that can make the user feel more secure 
online.  By providing a visual aid to the user showing the current status of the website being 
accessed, the users overall experience is improved. 
5 COMPARISON OF MODELS 
The three models reviewed have different approaches to the handling of identity 
management.  It is not possible to provide a valid comparison of the .NET Passport system, 
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which was implemented with a singular methodology, to the Liberty Alliance framework.  
The reason for this is that the latter is not a system, but a set of open technical standards 
which an organisation can implement.  The efficiency of a Liberty Alliance framework 
implementation is only as strong as the level to which the specifications are applied.  Further 
complicating this analysis is the Mozilla TrustBar.  The TrustBar looks at the identity 
management paradigm from that of the user.  TrustBar implements similar steps when 
performing authentication, but instead of the authentication of the user, the website being 
accessed is authenticated.  The consolidated comparisons, where they can be drawn are 
shown in Table 1. 
 .NET Passport 
(Lopez, Oppliger & Pernul, 2004) 
Liberty Alliance 
(Olsen & Mahler, 2007) 
Mozilla TrustBar 
(Herzberg, 2005) 
System Singular System implemented by 
Microsoft 
Open Specifications. Can be 
implemented in various ways within 
multiple different systems 
Single System 
implemented by Mozilla 
to handle classification of 
web addresses 
SSO Previously multi-organisation 
SSO.  Since 2003 single-
organisation sign-on 
Depends on implementation, supports 
multi-organisation SSO 
Single verification of 
websites accessed by user 
Choice of 
Identity 
Providers 
Microsoft was the only identity 
provider 
Allows for several identity providers so 
far as they are accepted by the service 
provider 
Mozilla serves as identity 
provider for authentication 
of websites 
Identifiers Personal Unique Identifier per user Unique handle per user per federated 
pair of website 
Unique identifiers per 
participating website 
Responsible 
controller 
Microsoft and service providers 
are single data controllers 
Controllers or processors? 
-Service providers within a circle of 
trust become data controllers “at the 
time users visit their websites” 
-However according to the Liberty 
Alliance, it is possible that some 
service providers may act as processors 
Mozilla and service 
providers as single data 
controllers 
Contractual 
Framework 
Contract between Microsoft and 
service provider 
Implementation dependant 
-Contract between every website in a 
circle of trust 
-Depending on the type of 
implementation other models may be 
possible, such as every participating 
service provider has a contract with one 
party which organises and administrates 
the circle of trust 
No contract required, 
makes use of open source 
community 
Table 1 – Comparison of .NET Passport, Liberty Alliance and Mozilla TrustBar 
Table 1 attempts to compartmentalise the three models into specific sections for 
comparison.  The .NET Passport is rooted as a singular entity, which is maintained by 
Microsoft.  All usage of the .NET Passport requires adherence to Microsoft standards by 
website vendors, stipulated in contracts between Microsoft and these parties.  The Liberty 
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Alliance makes use of a set of open specifications that can be implemented in various ways 
to allow for an SSO environment to be created for users. The SSO facility, however, only 
applies between websites within the same circle of trust, and should a user move out of the 
circle they must resubmit their login credentials.  TrustBar takes a different perspective 
looking at the issue from the user point of view.  TrustBar currently works off a single 
system, which is implemented by Mozilla, handling the classification and analysing the 
security of the websites, to create a central repository for determining website validity.  
The three models analysed provide a significant step towards meeting the overall goal 
of an integrated system for the protection of the user in the online environment.  To place 
each model into a specific category for the issues they address the models can be summarised 
as follows: 
• Microsoft .NET Passport – provides a solution for broad implementation of 
identification and verification of users within an SSO environment.  It also 
provides simple integration between vendors, due to a single user identification 
provider. 
• Liberty Alliance – provides a flexible solution for the website vendor through 
the use of circles of trust.  This is limited to providing SSO on a smaller scale 
because of the limited sizes of the circle of trust.  Each website within the circle 
of trust provides its own login forms for the user.  With a greater level of trust 
between the websites involved, the ability to audit user movements within the 
system is increased. 
• Mozilla TrustBar – provides a way to identify the website from the user 
perspective.  Through the implementation of an easy to use identification and 
verification process, the user is alerted to potential threats within the website 
they are seeking to access. 
6 USER CENTRIC ONLINE IDENTITY & AUTHENTICATION MANAGEMENT 
MODEL 
Although all three models discussed do provide a useful service, none cover all the 
needs of the user.  This is due to each model focusing on the sign-on or website identification 
issues.  None focus on the issues of the user and protection of the user within the online 
environment.  The issues that need to be addressed for the protection of users in the online 
environment can be summarised as follows: 
• Scam Protection – Users must be aware of potential scams online.  Education is 
the best prevention of these incidences (Bradley, 2007). 
• Spoofing – Users must be aware of fraudulent sites and the risks that can occur 
should their information be compromised (Herzberg, 2005). 
• Multiple Verification – When making use of multiple websites, each with 
individual login criteria, a facility to improve the user experience through the 
use of SSO methodology is required.  SSO reduces the potential for interception 
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of client login data, and promotes ease of use online (Lopez, Oppliger & Pernul, 
2007). 
• Credential Security – User credentials must be securely transmitted when 
authenticating SSO environments. 
Each of the models possesses attributes that address some of these user requirements 
but they themselves are insufficient. 
6.1 Authentication of IT Systems and Users 
Authentication procedures in the online world are more complex than there real world 
counterparts.  Through the use of brute force attacks, security controls can be compromised 
in a short period of time.  The use of social engineering techniques can make the process 
even simpler.  When performing the process of converting an offline system to an online 
version, technical authentication procedures are adapted to the online capabilities, frequently 
without adopting the security measures (FIDIS, 2006).  The authentication of the actual 
website may be adequate, but if users are unable to establish the trustworthiness of the 
website they are lured to, this authentication is in vain.  If more controls and checks are 
enforced along with dual authentication by users and systems, a more secure environment for 
the online user will be insured. 
6.1.1 Authentication of users by IT Systems 
From a technical viewpoint, an identity is nothing more than a digital pseudonym 
representing an individual.  Because of this, measures are required to prove the digital 
pseudonym belongs to the person whom claims to possess it (FIDIS, 2006). 
 
Figure 3 - Authentication by an IT System (FIDIS, 2006) 
Figure 3 depicts the ways in which an IT system can determine the authenticity of a 
user.  An increase in the number of criteria provides for a more comprehensive verification of 
the user to be enforced.  Based on these, IT systems can recognize a user by what he is 
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through the use of biometric techniques, what they possess, and what they know.  The higher 
the number of controls that can be implemented using these identification criteria, the higher 
the level of certainty will be that the user accessing the system is authorised to do so.  
Consequently the more criteria used for the authentication process, the higher the levels of 
trust created between the user and the system.  
6.1.2 Authentication of an IT System by a person 
User identity theft is performed through deceiving the user on a spoofed website.  A 
user enters their login information and attempts to connect, thereby sending their identity 
data to the perpetrator.  To curb this problem, users should authenticate an IT system using 
the criteria described by the Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS, 2006) are: 
• What the IT system is – By looking at the information contained on the website 
the user can determine its validity.  The immediate method of identifying a 
website is through the assessment of the website URL.  If the URL corresponds 
to that of the users expected website, they should continue by determining the 
validity of the website’s digital certificates.  In checking the digital certificates 
the user can determine the validity of the website.  This process can be 
automated through the use of a system such as the Mozilla TrustBar. 
• What the IT system knows – Through the registration process the user will 
setup their initial profile.  Some websites may request other personal 
information relating to the client.  In seeing this information the user is ensured 
they are on the correct website. 
Through the use of both user and system authentication in a dual pronged approach a 
user can ensure they are making use of a valid Internet website. 
6.2 A model for securing the user’s online experience 
In order to protect the use from the threats to their online identity, an approach is 
required that satisfies both user authentication and website authentication.  In Figure 4, a 
model is proposed which promotes a two-pronged solution to the protection of user 
information in the online environment.  The model addresses user protection from two 
angles.  The validity of the website is checked and reported to the user.  This is performed to 
ensure that the user is attempting to access and authenticate the correct version of the 
website.  After this, the process of SSO authentication takes place to allow the user to make 
use of the benefits of the SSO environment.  
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Figure 4 – Model for User Centric Online Protection 
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The process followed in the model is expanded as follows: 
1. User Requests Website – The user makes use of their browser and enters the URL of 
the website they intend to visit.  From selection of this website the process moves into 
the process responsible for the authentication of the website. 
2. Site Identification Request – When the user performs a request for the website, a 
request is sent to a repository responsible for the validation of websites.  The 
information in this repository provides information to the user in order for them to 
validate the security of the website. 
2.1 Check Website URL – Using the information stored in the repository checks are 
undertaken in order to determine the security built in the requested website. 
2.1.1  Determine Most Secure Site – A number of websites potentially have web pages, 
which are often more secure but are not set as the default login page.  In these cases the 
repository determines the most secure website.  If a more secure inner link for the same 
domain is found, the repository sends a redirect response to the browser to redirect t the 
more secure website.  Should this occur, then the process from Step 1 occurs. 
2.1.2 Site Security Check – Based on the URL the repository performs a search 
determining the validity of the digital certificates, authority of the certificate issuers, and 
if the site is flagged by the repository as a spoofed website.  The result of this is a URL 
validation report, which is then sent back to the user’s browser to display the results and 
allow the user the opportunity to validate the website themselves. 
3. Website Retrieval Request Sent – When a user’s request for a website is sent, the 
website is retrieved via HTTP protocols. 
4. User Login – Once the page has been loaded with information required for the 
validation report, the user attempts to login to the SSO website.  Incorporated within 
this process is the use of a biometric input, in the form of user fingerprint 
identification, along with password identification, which is used to provide a more 
secure environment.  If either of these validation procedures fails, the user is 
redirected to the initial login page.  If the sign-on is successful, then the user is 
verified and authenticated within the SSO environment.  This process ultimately leads 
to secure user identification. 
7 CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed the need for a comprehensive model for the protection of 
users within the online environment.  The roles of identity management and the benefits to 
the business were discussed to define the benefits of identity management solutions to 
businesses.  The role of access and authentication management provided an insight into 
online user habits with regards to security.  The three models of .NET Passport, Liberty 
Alliance Federated Identity and Mozilla TrustBar were examined to determine the processes 
followed by industry leading identity management solutions.  A critical comparison of these 
models was made which found that none cover all the needs of the user to create a 
comprehensive environment for the protection of the user.  A model was then proposed based 
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on the best practices of the industry to promote the use of dual levels of authentication.  This 
involves the user website authentication, and website identification by the user to create a 
secure environment.  In using a username and password along with other identification 
methods, the accuracy of user identification is increased.  In addition to this, the ability for 
the user to identify the website and verify its authenticity protects the user from the threats of 
spoofing.  This will protect the user from identity theft.  An alternative benefit of this process 
is higher levels of trust produced between the users and the vendors. 
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